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THE QUEBEC EXPERIENCE: CODIFICATION OF
FAMILY LAW AND A PROPOSAL FOR THE CREATION
OF A FAMILY COURT SYSTEM
Claire L'Heureux-Dub *
L'offide de la loi est de fixer, par de grandes vues, les maximes
generales du droit, d'etablir des principes feconds en consequences
et non de descendre dans le detail des questions qui peuvent nditre
sur chaque matier .
PORTALIS**
INTRODUCTION
Although at different periods and under different circumstances, both
the Louisiana and Quebec French civil-law codes were born from the same
mother and grew up similarly in a common law environment, always striv-
ing to preserve their roots. Given that background, the Quebec experience
in the codification of its civil law is of interest to Louisiana, if only out
of curiosity for the fate of its only sister in North America.
Except for the ten-year period of 1763 to 1773, Quebec has continu-
ously remained subject to the laws of France as those laws existed bet-
ween 1663 and 1763.2 In France, the French Revolution of 1789 was to
facilitate the codification of France's civil laws. It culminated in the pro-
mulgation on March 31, 1804, of the French civil code, Le Code
Copyright 1984, by Louisiana Law Review.
* Justice, Quebec Court of Appeal, Canada.
** Discours preliminaire prononce le 24 Thermidor, an VIII, as cited in 0. Kahn-
Freund, C. Levy & B. Rudden, A Source Book on French Law 75 (1st ed. 1973).
1. Baudouin, The Impact of the Common Law on the Civilian Systems of Louisiana
and Quebec, in Judicial Decisions and Doctrine 1, 10 (1974); Boult, Aspects des rapports
entre le droit civil et la "Common Law" dans la jurisprudence de la Cour supreme du
Canada, 53 Can. B. Rev. 738 (1975).
2. Edicts creating the Conseil Souverain. 1 Edicts, Ordonnaces Royaux at 37 (Quebec
1854). Canada had been a French possession under French laws since 1663. See the edicts
creating the Conseil Souverain, April 1663, under Louis XIV, conferring to such Conseil
the power to "connditre de toutes les causes civiles et criminelles, pour juger souveraine-
ment et en dernier ressort selon les lois et ordonnances de notre Royaume." Canada con-
verted to the laws of England at the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1763 with the Pro-
clamation Royale of October 7, 1763, and General Murray's Ordonnance of September 17,
1764. Ten years later, however, L'Acte de Quebec, 14 Geo. III, ch. 83 (1774), which reunited
Canada under one government, was to reinstate French civil laws in Quebec while in 1791
the Constitutional Act dividing Canada into two provinces, Lower Canada and Upper Canada,
restated that Lower Canada was to retain its French laws, and decreed English laws ap-
plicable to Upper Canada. See The Property and Civil Rights Act, Que. Rev. Stat. ch.
367 (1970) ("In all matters of controversy relative to property and civil rights, resort shall
be had to the laws of England as they stood on the 15th day of October 1792."); see
also P.B. Mignault, Le Droit Civil Canadien (Whiteford & Theoret eds. 1895).
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Napoleon,3 a product of Roman and customary laws, royal legislation,
and new laws adopted since the Revolution. In Quebec, however, the
codification of the French civil laws applicable to Quebec did not occur
until some fifty years later, and it came in a very different way.
THE CIVIL CODE OF LOWER CANADA: 1866
Sir Georges Etienne Cartier, then Attorney General and Prime Minister
of Canada, is "credited with having conceived and carried through the
project of codification," with the firm conviction that codification was
necessary in order to "coordinate -the existing law, to render all of it ac-
cessible to both the English and French languages" and that the Quebec
code be modeled after the Code Napoleon.' The purpose was not to
elaborate a new code inspired by ancient laws and jurisprudence, but rather
to collect existing laws and give them a coherent meaning, a concise form.
In the words of Professor Paul Andr6 Cr6peau, the drafters of the 1866
Civil Code of Lower Canada
were instructed essentially not to reform, but to reformulate the
law in such a manner as to transform it from an "archaic" legal
system into a "modern" legal system, following the example of
France and of so many other countries of Europe and America
which had already adopted their own codes. The security of a
single and ordered legislative enactment was to replace the uncer-
tainty created by a multiplicity of sources that were widely
dispersed.
However, the legislature specifically ordered that it was the law
that was in force at that time that was to be codified, and that
it was to be done along the same lines and according to the same
plan as the French Civil Code. The entirety of the basic institu-
tions of our private law as it then existed was to be regrouped
into a coherent and organic whole, expressed in clear and simple
terms.
The aim of the codification was thus put into a context in which
the determination to preserve the then existing law overrode any
desire for change. As no need was felt to question traditional
values, real innovations were few and far between.
3. Loi contenant la reunion des lois civiles en un seul corps de lois sous le titre Code
civil des Francais (Loi du 30 Ventome, an XII, decretee le 21 mars 1804 et promulguee
le 31 mars 1804).
4. Brierley, Quebec's Civil Law Codification: Viewed and Reviewed, 14 McGill L.J.
521, 530-31 (1968). For a full discussion of political as well as technical factors leading
to codification, see P. Cr~peau, La renaissance du droit civil canadien; A. Morel, La codifica-
tion devant l'opinion publique de l'6poque; see also P. Boucher & T. Morel, Le Droit dans
la Vie familiale, Livre du Centenaire du Code civil (1) (1970).
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The purpose was to construct a Code which, embodying the
past, would serve as a defense against outside influences which
threatened the integrity of the Civil Law; it would guarantee the
survival of a legal system that was distinctive but exposed due
to its isolation within a continent in which the Common Law held
sway. Regarded, like the French Civil Code, as the embodiment
of Justice and Reason, it seemed inconceivable that its principles
could be shaken by the vicissitudes of life. It was believed that
the Civil Code would escape the effects of the passage of time.'
This does not mean that existing laws were always adopted without
modification. Amendments were proposed by the redactors and, in many
instances, retained. Furthermore, the model of the Code Napoleon was
followed, and substantive reform departed from it in many cases because
of the diversity of sources which, by that time, had impregnated the Lower
Canada civil laws-the English substantive law had been imported in some
measure, and domestic legislation had been enacted from time to time.
In the final analysis, the Civil Code of Lower Canada could be but the
product of the social and economic circumstances of its time:
"autoritarisme, individualisme et liberalisme."6
THE REPORT ON THE QUEBEC CIVIL CODE:
THE CIVIL CODE REVISION OFFICE-1955-1978
Historical Background
In order to better understand the spirit with which the revision of
Quebec's civil laws was undertaken, it is necessary to appreciate the
political, social and economic texture of Quebec at that particular time
in its history. In 1955, in Quebec, what was to later become known as
the Quiet Revolution was well under way. Prime Minister Maurice
Duplessis (1936-1939 and 1944-1959) and his conservative'government were
gradually heading towards their downfall, which was to lead to the take-
over by Premier Jean Lesage in 1960, an era which was to be among
the most exciting of Quebec's political history, a predecessor to the ad-
vent of separatism. Separatism took a concrete form with the election
of Rene Levesque as Premier of Quebec in 1976.
Quebec's closely knit society, preserved so far by political and religious
conservatism from being permeated by the emergence of attractive
philosophical trends enhancing equality, individual freedom and personal
power of the individual over the state,7 could no longer escape the
5. Civil Code Revision Office, 1 Report on the Quebec Civil Code: The Draft Civil
Code at xxiv-xxv (1977) [hereinafter cited as Report].
6. Cr~peau, Introduction to Les enjeux de la revision du Code civil at 14 (1979) (under
the direction of Andr6 Poupart, Montreal: F.E.P.).
7. C.B. Macpherson, La theorie politique et lindividualisme Possessif de Hobbes &
Locke 971 (1971).
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economic, political and social change of the world around it, particularly
with the advent in Quebec of the "affluent society" or the economic
growth which followed the election of a liberal government.
During the twenty-year period from 1950 to 1970 in particular, Quebec
emerged from its lethargy. The change was rapid and dramatic, stem-
ming from pressures of Quebec's significant groups.' Almost all social
institutions were brought in question. It was the beginning of a stronger
labour movement, encouraged by the universities and their professors in
the newly developed field of social sciences. The educational system was
revolutionized along the lines of modern thinking.9 The church itself was
not to be spared: its powerful imprint on Quebec's French Canadian
population (close to ninety-five percent Roman Catholic) was losing
ground. Of course, other realities played an important role in bringing
about a shift in the moral values of the Quebec society. These included
the entrance of married women into the labour force, mass access to for-
mal education, urbanization, and the advent of the social welfare state.
Traditions were profoundly shaken.'"
In those times of upheavals, the Civil Code of Lower Canada could
not go unchallenged. Criticism of the system of values it carried was voiced
more and more frequently, and demands for adjusting the scales of justice
to a modern and pluralistic society became more pressing."I
These events led to a political mandate to reform Quebec's code of
civil laws, many of which were out-of-date in their basic philosophy or
ill-suited for tackling problems arising from modern life. Even legislative
innovations attempting to solve the most urgent problems, often hastily
put together, and judicial interpretation had not been able to achieve the
extensive reform necessary to restore to the Civil Code its primary func-
tion: "that of governing relations between citizens in accordance with the
norms, concepts and techniques of our time. In short, the Civil Code
8. G. Pelletier, Les annees d'impatience (1983).
9. Rapport de la Commission royale d'enqufte sur l'enseignement dans la Province
de Quebec, Volume 1-Structures sup~rieures du syst~me scolaire (1963); Volume 2-Structures
pddagogiques du syst~me scolaire (1964). The Commission had been created in 1960. 9-10
Eliz. 11, Que. Stat. ch. 25 (1960-61).
10. L. Dion, La prochaine revolution (1973); M. Rioux, Kinships, Recognition and
Urbanization in French Canadian Society 376 (Carleton Library no. 18, 1964); G. Rocher,
Le Quebec en mutation 25 (1973).
11. La Revision du Code civil, Cours de perfectionnement du Notariat 335-54 (1977);
Baudouin, Le Code civil qu6bdcois: Crise de croissance ou crise de vieillesse, 44 Can. B.
Rev. 391 (1966); Cr~peau, Civil Code Revision in Quebec, 34 La. L. Rev. 921 (1974); Cr~peau,
Centenaire du Code civil du Quebec, 44 Can. B. Rev. 389 (1966); Dumford, The Landlord's
Obligation to repair and the Recourses of the Tenant, 44 Can. B. Rev. 477 (1966); Lilikoff,
Le Code civil et l'autonomie du droit, 44 Can. B. Rev. 443 (1966); Rinfret, La revision
du Code civil, 15 R. du B. 313 (1955); J. Turgeon, De la revision du Code civil qu~b~cois,
29 Can. B. Rev. 70 (1951); Conseil general du Barreau, Modification du Code civil: situa-
tion juridique de la femme mari6e, 6 R. du B. 202 (1946) (a comment).
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had to be made to reflect the society of Quebec in the latter part of the
twentieth century." 2
Thus, in 1955, the Quebec legislature entrusted the general revision
of the Civil Code of Lower Canada to a jurist;' 3 that revision was to
serve as a basis on which a final draft of a new Civil Code would be
prepared. The Quebec Civil Code Revision Office (C.C.R.O.) got its main
impetus, however, in 1965 with the nomination as sole commissioner of
Professor Paul Andr6 Cr6peau of Montreal's McGill University."
Objectives
The spirit and objectives of the 1955 revision of Quebec's civil laws
bore no relation to the objectives of the 1866 codifiers. The historical
background which presided over both differed drastically, as did the mores
and system of values of Quebec society at those two moments in its history,
one hundred years apart.
No one has stated the goals of the codification better than the master-
mind of the reform, Professor Paul Andrd Cr6peau, despite the affinity
with the 1866 codification indicated by the legislator in 1955.
The task of revision could not be approached in the same spirit
as that which guided the first codification. In comparison with
what was done a little more than a century ago, it seemed to
us that the situation called for a complete reversal in the objec-
tives to be achieved. The obsolescence of the Civil Code required
that priority be given to reforming the institutions of the Civil
Law, and that there be undertaken, in the light of experience and
of comparative law, a systematic examination of the entire Code,
with a view to removing the traces of a vanished past and to
bringing the law into harmony with contemporary reality.
To be sure, this rethinking of the fundamental principles of
the Code led to changes being proposed in the traditional rules
of the Civil Law that are at times profound.' 5
The Commissioner further defined these objectives as follows:
Un premier objectif visait d r~soudre les conflits d'interpr6tation
doctrinale ou judiciaire du Code civil.
12. 1 Report, supra note 5, at xxvii.
13. An Act respecting the Revision of the Civil Code, L.Q. ch. 47 (1954-1955) (assented
to on February 10, 1955). Its work truly started only in 1962 with the nomination of M.
Andre Nadeau, Q.C. After his nomination to the Quebec Superior Court, he was replaced
by Professor Paul Andre Cr~peau, Q.C., of McGill University.
14. October 1, 1965.
15. 1 Report, supra note 5, at xxvii.
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Un deuxi~me objectif concernait l'interprdtation au Code civil
de la legislation, dite statutaire, en matibre de droit civil.
Le troisi~me objectif-et le plus important-obligeait A une
r~flexion critique, A ]a lumibre de l'exp~rience et des lecons du
droit compare, sur les raisons, les politiques l~gislatives qui avaient
presid&, au dix-neuvi~me sibcle, A l'Flaboration du Code civil.'"
Plan and Method
The redactors of the 1866 Code had closely followed the plan of the
Code Napoleon. After a preliminary title dealing with "promulgation,
distribution, effect, application, interpretation and execution of the laws
in general,"' 7 the Civil Code of Lower Canada was divided into four
main sections: Book First-Of persons; Book Second-Of Property, of
Ownership and its Different Modifications; Book Third-Of the Acquisi-
tion and Exercise of Rights of Property; and Book Fourth-Commercial
Law (this last book corresponding to the French Code de commerce). It
contained 2714 articles. The C.C.R.O. departed from that tradition in
order to effect a more rational grouping of matters and to respect the
autonomy of each of Quebec's fundamental private law institutions.
As submitted by the Minister of Justice to the Quebec National
Assembly on June 10, 1978, the Draft Civil Code contained 3288 articles
divided into nine books; it eliminated the former preliminary title, in-
tegrating its dispositions into the Interpretation Act and Book Ninth on
private international law. " Those books were entitled: Persons (I); Family
Law (II); Succession (III); Property (IV); Obligations (V); Evidence (VI);
Prescription (VII); Publicity of Rights (VIII); and Private International
Law (IX).
The monumental task of achieving "un corps de lois vivant, moderne,
sensible aux preoccupations, attentif aux besoins accord6 aux exigences,
dine societe qu~b~coise aujourd'hui en pleine mutation, A la recherche
d'un 6quilibre nouveau,"" was viewed primarily as a collective effort of
reflection on our fundamental private law institutions. This involved the
participation of and consultation with professionals and laymen alike on
the various aspects of the reform. More than 150 professionals participated
regularly as members of more than fifty committees, and a number of
other individuals participated as consultants or as research or resource
persons on an ad hoc basis.
16. Crep~au, supra note 15, at 6.
17. Civ. Code Lower Can.; preliminary title.
18. 1 Report, supra note 5.
19. 1 Report, supra note 5, at xxvi (French ed.).
1580 [Vol. 44
FAMILY LA W
The method chosen is described by Professor Cr~peau in the foreword
to the Report on the Quebec Civil Code, and as it is the key to the suc-
cess of that unique undertaking, the foreword warrants reproduction in
extenso.
The first stage of consultation consisted of setting up study com-
mittees responsible for submitting drafts or reforms in particular
areas of the Civil Law.
The committee was the key to the reform. Consisting generally
of three to seven jurists-judges, lawyers, civil servants, and
professors-it was able to count on the constant collaboration
of research assistants; it was able to commission special studies,
and to consult experts-jurists and others, and to interview in-
dividuals or organizations that might be affected by a particular
reform; and finally, it prepared a report comprising a draft reform
accompanied by explanatory notes both French and English.
The second stage of consultation involved outside participation.
Its main purpose was to submit the committee reports to the free
and unrestricted appraisal of interested persons and organizations.
Thus, each of the forty-seven reports of the committees of the
Office was printed in about 2,000 copies which were distributed
to government departments, courts, universities, professional
organizations, unions, women's associations, political groups,
religious bodies, social agencies, banking institutions, and news
agencies, and also to an increasing number of individuals who
on all sides showed an interest in the reform of the Code, and
finally, to foreign civil and comparative law experts. Each was
invited to submit observations and criticisms in writing by a cer-
tain date.
Where the subject-matter was appropriate or the nature of the
observations warranted it, public study or information sessions
were held to enable members of a committee to understand more
fully the ideas of the authors of briefs, and even to enable authors
of brief, to discuss among themselves the various legislative op-
tions in question. This method sometimes produced excellent
results because it made it possible to realize that opposing interests
are not always irreconcilable, that agreement could often be
reached, or that a diversity of opinions did not always result from
ill will, but most often from legitimately opposed interests. When
these consultations were completed, the committee resumed study
of its report in the light of the observations, comments and
criticisms, and prepared the final reports which it submitted to
the Office.
The third stage of consultation consisted in coordinating the
work of the study committees. Obviously, where every Commit-
1984]
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tee, as it had the right to do, freely presented its legislative op-
tions, there could result-and this was a good thing-conflicts
in legislative policy or terminology. In effect, it would be surpris-
ing if, in these days, a hundred and fifty jurists, representing the
various sectors of the profession, belonging to different genera-
tions and coming from every corner of Quebec, each having his
own political, social, religious or moral views, were to arrive at
unanimity. Thus steps had to be taken to ensure the coordination
of the work. A Coordinating Committee was set up, to which
difficult cases of conflict in legislative policy were referred. A
Reading Committee was established with responsibility for style
and consistency in the vocabulary. Where necessary, final arbitra-
tion was brought to bear by the President of the Office.
Thus was conceived and written the Draft Civil Code which
the National Assembly of Quebec will be called upon to examine
and, if it approves, to adopt.2"
Main Features
Although the focus here is on the Quebec Code of Family Law as
it stands today, it was conceived as an integrated part of the whole reform
of civil laws; Family Law revision is a tributary of the basic philosophy
which inspired the C.C.R.O. Thus, the reports of the C.C.R.O. on Family
Law and Family Courts will be freely employed in approaching and
discussing the subject. The Draft Civil Code of Quebec was an extensive
reform in the civilian tradition of conciseness and clarity, an effort to
update Quebec's civil laws into line with the mores and techniques of
modern times. It was achieved through a collective and systematic rethink-
ing of our basic institutions.
All this involved increased powers of intervention by the courts, even
in contractual matters, so that injustices could be rectified in cases of
undue hardship due to circumstances or abuse.
The dominant theme of the reform is a marked concern for the human
person over the protection of property, stemming from a desire to
recognize "the role of the human person, along with affirmation and pro-
tection of human dignity" as the cornerstone of private law relationships.2
Equally important was the principle of equality before the law of con-
sorts, parents, and children, whatever the circumstances of their birth.
The rights of children to affection and security were stressed, as were
their best interests in all decisions concerning them. The protection of
the family unit was another strong concern, although recognition of de
20. Id. at xxxiv-xxxv.
21. Id. at xxix.
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facto unions seemed inevitable. Fundamental human rights are expressed
in positive terms rather than negative standards of behavior.
In the contractual field, contracts were divided into three categories:
employment, services, enterprise. Contractual arbitration with respect to
both present and future disputes would now be valid. Contract rules, while
affirming the principle of freedom in legal relationships, were tempered
by the desire to protect the consumer of goods and services and avoid
abuses resulting from contractual imbalance.
In undertaking the modernization of the law, new concepts such as
trusts, hypothecs on movable property, and the removal of all privileges
were to be retained. Modern techniques were recognized in the centraliza-
tion of civil status acts as well as registration of real rights. And the law
of evidence underwent certain changes in order to put increased emphasis
on testimony, and permit the disallowance of illegally obtained evidence.
The list of more specific and detailed proposals for reform could go
on and on. Each of the proposals put forward by the C.C.R.O. is substan-
tiated and explained in commentaries submitted with the Report, which
also includes reference to jurisprudence and doctrine.
Implementation
The C.C.R.O. Report on the Quebec Civil Code was presented to
the National Assembly on June 20, 1978, to serve as the basis on which
a final draft of a new Civil Code was to be prepared.22 Considering the
wide range of proposed reform and related studies, it was considered
necessary to spread the enactment of its main parts out over a period
of time.23 To date, only that part of the Draft Civil Code relating to
the reform of family law has been the object of legislation,2" although
other parts are now before the legislature for study and eventual embodi-
ment in legislation.2"
Although embodied in a Civil Law Code, the Family Code in Quebec
was seen as a separate code, one in need of urgent and pressing reform.
It was dealt with by the legislature on a priority basis, independently of
other civil law reform, as a whole, and with parliamentary debate limited
to that area of the law. This, in some measure, does alleviate some of
the criticism associated with codification of family law.
22. See supra note 13.
23. Bill 89 (assented to December 19, 1980); An Act to Establish a New Civil Code
and to Reform Family Law, Que. Stat. 1980, ch. 39 (1980) (partially in force April 2, 1981)
(followed by An Act to provide for the carrying out of the Family Law Reform and to
amend the Code of Civil Procedure, Que. Stat. ch. 17 (1982) (enacted June It, 1982)).
24. Que. Stat. ch. 17 (1982).
25. Bill 106, An Act to add the Reformed Law of Persons to the Civil Code of Quebec,
and Bill 107, An Act to add the Reformed Law of Successions to the Civil Code of Quebec,
15831984]
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CODIFICATION OF FAMILY LAW
Book Second of the Quebec Civil Code, entitled "The Family," was
assented to on December 19, 1980, and has been only partially in force
since April 2, 1981. It contains only 259 articles, although correlative
amendments to the Civil Code of Lower Canada and transitory measures
were also necessary. The Quebec Family Code is divided into five titles:
Marriage (I); Divorce (II); Filiation (Il); The Obligation of Support (IV);
and Parental Authority (V). The Family Code was inspired by the same
basic philosophy of protection of the dignity of the human person and
was developed by the same method of collective reflection as was the revi-
sion of the entire Code of Civil Laws.
THE CIVIL CODE OF QUEBEC: BOOK TwO-THE FAMILY
Historical Background
Outmoded by today's reality and the prevailing trends of contemporary
thought, family law had gone through a crise de vieillissement in its fun-
damental assumptions.2 6 The Civil Code of Lower Canada reflected "not
only religious and political influences, but also the conditions of a social
world long past." 7 Its treatment of the family rested fundamentally on
the principles of marital and paternal authority, dependence and obedience
of the wife, and insolubility of marriage and a view of the extended family
prevalent at the time of the 1866 codification. 8
Shaped by historic forces, the traditional family, until recently,
was a close-knit, although extended unit devoted to the common
interest of its members. It was, as a rule, stable and of lifelong
duration. Meulders-Klein has described the traditional family in
a few words:
Que ce soit dans le cadre d'une soci6t6 sans classe, simple et
homog~ne, ou dans le cadre plus vaste et plus complexe d'une
soci~t6 de classes, antique, f~odale ou m~me bourgeoise, la famille
traditionnelle postule la soumission t des valeurs ou int~rfts com-
muns et ne toler gure que l'union conjugale et la stabilit6
familiale soient livr~es aux tribulations de la subjectivite
individuelle.
have undergone first reading December 17, 1982, and a study by a Parliamentary Commis-
sion, April 12-14, 1983.
26. Baudouin, La famille face A un code moderne-Le droit dans la vie familiale, in
R. Boucher & T. Morel, supra note 4, at 50.
27. Elkin, The social milieu and problems of matrimonial relief, in R. Boucher & T.
Morel, supra note 4, at 143.
28. Baudouin, supra note 26; Cr~peau, Le droit familial du Quebec: Rdalities nouvelles
et Perspectives d'avenir, 51 Can. B. Rev. 169 (1973); Civil Code Revision Office, 2 Report
on the Quebec Civil Code-Commentaries at 109 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Commentaries].
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Conversely, the modern family, nuclear in dimension and of
increasingly short duration, is based on the free will of the par-
ties. It is oriented towards equality and its partners are free to
pursue individual happiness. The state is assumed to play a neutral,
if not a supportive role. 9
Demands for reform became more pressing.3" In fact, "under the
pressure of the requirements of a society undergoing change ...a body
of civil law legislation"'" had been developing on the fringe of the Code.
From 1897 to 1980, no less than eleven statutes were enacted in the field
of family law alone, some of them effecting major reforms as regards,
for instance, the capacity of married women, matrimonial regimes, and
the age of majority.32 Most of these reforms were brought about as a
result of pressure from women's groups, whose awareness was stimulated
in 1968 by the Divorce Act." Eventually, however, piecemeal legislation
and judicial interpretation proved insufficient to provide the profound
transformation of the basic assumptions of the 1866 Code that was re-
quired. It was necessary to bring the law in harmony with reality, to bridge
the gap between law and life.
29. L'Heureux-DubM, Family Law in Transition: An Overview, in Family Law-
Dimensions of Justice 301-02 (R.S. Abella & C. L'Heureux-Dubd eds. 1983) [hereinafter
cited as Family Law].
30. Baudouin, Le Code civil qu6b6cois: Crise de croissance ou crise de vieillisse, 44
Can. B. Rev. 391 (1966); Baudouin, De certaines r~formes n&essaires du droit qu~b(cois,
2 Ottawa L. Rev. 363 (1968).
31. 1 Report, supra note 5, at xxv, xviii.
32. See An Act to abolish the continuation of community, to create legal usufruct in
certain cases, and for that purpose to amend articles 1323 to 1337, inclusively, of the Civil
Code, 60 Vict. ch. 52 (1897) (assented to January 9, 1896); An Act to amend the Civil
Code respecting successions, 5 Geo. V, ch. 74 (1915) (assented to March 5, 1915); An Act
respecting adoption 14 Geo. V, ch. 75 (1924) (assented to March 15, 1924); An Act to
amend the Civil Code and Code of Civil Procedure respecting the civil rights of women,
21 Geo. V, ch. 101 (1930-1931) (assented to March 11, 1931); (Civ. Code Lower Can. arts.
1425a-1425i, 1389a, 1389b); An Act to amend the Civil Code, 9 Geo. VI, ch. 66 (1945)
(assented to June 1, 1945) (Civ. Code Lower Can. art. 1279a); see also Que. Stat. ch. 48,
art. 3 (1954-1955) (removing the name of the married woman from the list of persons declared
incapable of contracting and adding article 986a which provides for the limited capacity
of married women); Que. Stat. ch. 66 (1964) (hailed Bill 16 at the time, proclaiming the
full capacity of the married woman); Que. Stat. ch. 82 (1968) (the solemnization of civil
marriages; Que. Civ. Code art. 129); Que. Stat. ch. 77 (1969) (Act respecting matrimonial
regimes; Que. Civ. Code arts. 1266c-1266z); Que. Stat. ch. 62 (1970) (certain rights granted
to natural children and their parents); Que. Stat. ch. 85 (1971) (the age of majority lowered
to 18, and provision made for the legitimation of adulterine children through their parents'
subsequent marriage; Que. Civ. Code arts. 246, 324).
33. The Divorce Act, Can. Rev. Stat. ch. D-8 (1970) (assented to February 1, 1968,
in force July 2, 1968, Can. Stat. ch. 24 (1967-1968)). The Divorce Act was to make
matrimonial relief accessible to Quebec couples on grounds other than adultery and other-
wise than by an act of Parliament. Quebec Family law, which still considered marriage
as indissoluble, nevertheless adopted legislation providing for the financial consequences of
divorce. Que. Stat. ch. 74 (1969).
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According to Professor H. R. Hahlo,
The factors which led from the old to the new order,
culminating in the reforms of the post-World War II period, are
common knowledge. They are industrialization and urbanization;
the diminishing influence of the Church in setting standards of
positive morality; the weakening of family bonds and the
emergence of the liberated individual from the cocoons of family
and group; the stress on the rights to self-expression and self-
fulfilment; and the rapid increase in the number of working wives,
two-income families and one-parent families. Most of all, it was
"women's liberation", the hard-won recognition of women's legal
equality.
The pivotal point in the evolution of a new kind of marriage
was the shift in the divorce laws of Western jurisdictions from
fault to failure; from the matrimonial offence (adultery, cruelty,
desertion) to irretrievable marriage breakdown as the main, if not
the only ground of divorce."
Objectives
The family law reform had two basic objectives: equality between con-
sorts and between parents and equality of children before the law, whatever
the circumstances of their birth. With these goals firmly set, the C.C.R.O.
went about the task of adapting "family institutions to the realities faced
by modern Quebec families and, where necessary, to simplify them." 3
Because it felt that "no real family law reform can be imagined
without first acquiring an overall concept of the subject and co-ordinating
its different aspects into a logical whole," 36 the C.C.R.O. disregarded con-
stitutional problems and included some provisions on matters failing clearly
within federal jurisdiction (i.e., divorce) in an attempt to fully realize these
objectives. Still other provisions "raise[d] special problems as to legislative
authority," but most were within provincial jurisdiction.37 To implement
these objectives, the C.C.R.O. also proposed conflict resolution procedures
and other measures for the conciliation of family disputes and the pro-
tection of the interests of the children in all decisions concerning them.
This brings us to the more detailed examination of the main features of
the reform.
34. Hahlo, The Changing Face of Marriage and Divorce, in Family Law, supra note
29, at 273.
35. 2 Commentaries, supra note 28, at 112.
36. Id. at 110.
37. Id.; see also jurisprudence cited id. at 218; Baudoin, La repartition des comp&ences
l6gislatives au Canada en matiere de mariage et de divorce, 4 R.G.D. 66 (1973). The provi-
sions relating to divorce, Que. Civ. Code bk. 2, tit. 2, have not come into force due to
the constitutional problem involved.
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Substantive Reform: Main Features
The draft Family Code proposed by the C.C.R.O. was made up of




Chapter I-Promises of marriage
Chapter II-Conditions required for contracting marriage
Chapter III-Opposition to marriage
Chapter IV-The solemnization of marriage
Chapter V-Proof of marriage
Chapter VI-Nullity of marriage
Chapter VII-Effects of marriage
Section I -Rights and duties of consorts
Section II -The family residence
Section III -General provisions
Chapter VIII-Matrimonial regimes
Section I -General provisions
Section II -Partnership of acquests
§ - I Composition of the partnership of acquests
§ - 2 Administration of property and liability for
debts
§ - 3 Dissolution and liquidation of the regime
Section III -Community of property
§ - 1 Community of moveables and acquests
I-Assets and liabilities of the community of
moveables and acquests
II-Administration of the community of
moveables and acquests, and effect of the acts
of consorts
III-Dissolution of the community
IV-Acceptance of the community
V-Partition of the community
VI-Renunciation of the community and its
effects
§ - 2 Principal clauses that may modify the com-
munity of moveables and acquests
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I-The community reduced to acquests
II-The right to take back free and clear what
was brought into the community
III-Clauses by which unequal shares in the
community are assigned to the consorts
IV-Community by general title
§ - 3 Reserved property
Section IV -Separation as to property
§ - 1 Conventional separation as to property
§ - 2 Judicial separation as to property
Chapter IX-Dissolution of marriage
Chapter X-Separation as to bed and board, and divorce
Section I -General provision
Section II -Agreements in cases of defacto separation
Section III -Grounds for separation as to bed and
board and for divorce
Section IV -Conciliation
Section V -Provisional measures
Section VI -Accessory measures
Section VII-Effects of separation as to bed and board
and of divorce
Title Two-Filiation
Chapter I-Filiation by blood
Section I -Establishment of filiation
Section II -Disavowal and contestation of paternity
Section III -Proof of filiation
Section IV -Effects of filiation
Chapter II-Adoption
Section I -Conditions for adoption
Section II -Placement for adoption and judgments
Section III -Effects of adoption
Section IV -Confidentiality, offences, and penalties
Title Three-The Obligation of Support
Title Four-Parental Authority
The Family Code that was eventually adopted, however, differs
markedly from the Family Code that appears in the Draft Civil Code
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submitted by the C.C.R.O. The draft Family Code was the object of a
number of changes resulting from either parliamentary debate or, as was
more often the case, from different-and at times divergent-policy deci-
sions by the legislature. Many of these changes were unexplained and
served only to frustrate the goal of modernizing the law to reflect con-
temporary society or to confuse the law rather than clarify it. Three pro-
minent examples can be used to illustrate the problems resulting from
many of the changes.
First, the C.C.R.O. had devoted an entire chapter to the promises
of marriage in an "attempt to resolve certain contradictions in doctrine
and jurisprudence relating to the effects of broken engagements." 38 The
Quebec Civil Code simply omitted that chapter without any explanation.
Next, acknowledging the fact that an increasing number of couples
choose to live together on a continuing and open basis in a de facto union
rather than going through marriage," and that in doing so some couples
encounter a number of legal situations with which courts had to deal,"0
the C.C.R.O. had proposed a minimum regulation "to offer solutions
to the legal problems such unions inevitably create, and to regulate the
rights and duties of de facto consorts with regard to third parties and,
to some extent, with regard to each other."" Minimum rules were deemed
necessary for the protection of the consorts, their children and property,
although no constraints or obligations that such couples were seeking to
avoid were imposed out of respect for individual freedom. These rules
concerned the obligation of support as long as the consorts live together
(article 338 of Book Two), contributions towards household expenses (ar-
ticle 49 of Book Two), and the presumption of paternity of the de facto
husband (article 266 of Book Three). While social and fiscal legislations
in particular, and even the Civil Code of Lower Canada itself, had some
provisions giving effect to the de facto unions, 2 the same legislature drop-
ped all reference to de facto unions from Bill 89, introducing family law
reform, on the grounds that it was inopportune to institutionalize or
regulate a way of life freely chosen by the parties. 3
38. 2 Commentaries, supra note 28, at 123.
39. J. Eekelaar & S. Katz, Marriage and Cohabitation in Contemporary Societies (1980).
40. Therrien v. Granville, 1976 S.C.R. 777; Beaudoin-Daigneault v. Richard, Supreme
Court of Canada, Feb. 2, 1984.
41. 2 Commentaries supra note 28, at 113.
42. Social Aid Act, Que. Stat. ch. 63, § Id (1969); Quebec Pension Plan, Que. Stat.
ch. 64 (1965); (Canada) Pension Act, Can. Rev. Stat. ch. P-7 (1970); Automobile Insurance
Act, Que. Stat. ch. 68, art. 7 (1977); An Act to establish the Regie du logement and to
amend the Civil Code and other legislation, Que. Stat. ch. 48 (1979); Heleine, Le Con-
cubinage, institution a la merci des politiques lgislatives des diff~rents departements
minist6riels, 40 R. du B. 624 (1980).
43. Une autre application concrete du principe de la libert6 des individus dans
le choix de la forme d'organisation de leur cellule doit 6galement exister 5 l'6gard
de l'union de fait. Lors de la Commission parlementaire de la Justice sur la r~forme
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The third example concerns accessory measures upon divorce.
Although these rules have not become effective because of the constitu-
tional problem involved," they form part of Book Two-The Family,
assented to by the Legislative Assembly on December 19, 1980. In the
Draft Civil Code the C.C.R.O. has proposed the following articles:
Art. 337. Divorced consorts and persons whose marriage has
been annulled owe each other support, unless the court decides
otherwise.
Art. 256. The court, in granting a divorce or subsequently,
may, according to the circumstances, declare extinguished the right
of the former consorts to claim support from each other.
The articles actually adopted in Book Two-The Family read as
follows:
Art. 560. Divorce extinguishes the right which the spouses had
to claim support unless, on a motion, the court, in granting a
divorce, orders one of the spouses to pay support to the other
or reserves the right to claim support.
Art. 561. The court may reserve the right to claim support
only if, on granting the divorce, it is unable to rule equitably
as to such right, either because one spouse is prevented by excep-
tional circumstances from availing himself of his right, or because
it has been established that the existing state of the needs and
means of the spouses is likely to change in the near future.
In no case may the right to claim support be reserved for a
period of over two years.
Art. 562. If the court grants support to a spouse, it is payable
as a pension.
The court may replace or complete the alimentary pension by
a fixed sum payable immediately or by instalments over a period
of not more than three years.
Art. 563. The order awarding support may be reviewed by
the court whenever new facts so justify.
du droit de la famille en mars 1979, la plupart des m6moires soumis demandaient
aux 16gislateurs de respecter cette volont6 des couples non mari6s de distinguer
leur choix de formule de vie par rapport au mariage. 11 y a donc paru opportun
de ne pas intervenir A l'gard de ce mode de vie librement d6cid6; il n'y a donc
pas lieu de l'institutionnaliser ou de le r~glementer.
23 Journal des debats 208 (Dec. 4, 1980). However, conclusions drawn by the C.C.R.O.
from the "memories" and varied comments it received were to the effect that "most of
them favoured introducing some regulations . .. the extent of regulation is highly con-
troversial." 2 Commentaries, supra note 28, at 113.
44. Bk. 2 arts. 538-571. See Bill 89, § 80.
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However, no order awarding a fixed sum may be reviewed even
in the case of unforeseen change in the means or needs of the
parties.
Art. 564. Except in the case of fraud, the right of a spouse
to claim support is extinguished pleno jure at the expiry of the
period during which the right has been reserved if it has not been
exercised.
Art. 565. Where the court has awarded support or reserved
the right to claim support, it may at all times after divorce declare
the right to support extinguished.
Art. 633. Spouses, and relatives in the direct line, owe each
other support.
The C.C.R.O. felt that there was no need to alter the law as it then
existed-it contained flexible as well as equitable provisions, subject to
the limits laid down by jurisprudence- 4 I and that it was necessary to
remove doubts as to the power of judges to declare all rights of support
extinguished." The Government took the opposite view, without stating
any reasons for its departure from the course proposed by the C.C.R.O. 7
Only the substantive changes brought about by the enactment of Book
Two - The Family will be discussed, and the differing proposals made
by the C.C.R.O. will be referred to only when they are useful to enlighten
discussion of the substantive changes actually made. The focus will be
on the amendments of a fundamental nature and the provisions enacted
to implement these amendments. The most fundamental of the substan-
tive changes in the family law are to be found in its adoption of the
principles of equality between both consorts and parents and equality be-
tween children, whatever the circumstances of their birth, and its adop-
tion of special measures to prevent or redress inequalities.
EQUALITY BETWEEN CONSORTS AND PARENTS
The recognition of full equality between both consorts and parents
as one of the two basic principles of the revision of Family Law, in line
with the provisions of the Quebec Charter of Rights,"1 was the culmina-
tion of over one hundred years of evolution in legislation relating to family
law. Only one hundred years ago, article 174 of the Civil Code of Lower
Canada expressed with assurance the authority of the husband over his
wife: "A husband owes protection to his wife, a wife obedience to her
45. Shafran v. Shafran, 1970 C.A. 1174, aff'g 1969 R.P. 101 (S.C.).
46. Guay v. Dadoury-Guay, 1973 C.A. 720.
47. 23 Journal des debats (Dec. 4, 1980).
48. Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, Que. Rev. Stat. ch. C-12 (1977) (in force
June 25, 1975; Que. Stat. ch. 6 (1975)).
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husband." Under that Code, "[e]quality of the spouses was . . . illegal.
[However,] [t]he Civil Code now embodies the opposite rule: the hus-
band and wife are equal and they do not have the right to give up this
equality." 9
The Long Road to Equality
Article 986 of the Civil Code of Lower Canada listed married women
as incapable of contracting, alongside minors and interdicts. In a fun-
damental reform in 1931, the married woman was given the entire ad-
ministration, under any matrimonial regime, of the proceeds of her salary,
but the reform did not go as far as to render married women fully capable
of exercising their civil rights." A great step forward for married women-
or so it was thought-came on December 16, 1954, when the legislature
removed the married women from the list of persons declared incapable
in article 986, and adopted article 986a.1' It reads: "The capacity of mar-
ried women to contract like their capacity to appear in judicial proceedings
is determined by law." However, this amendment did not erase other pro-
visions of the Code creating real incapacities for the married woman. 2
These incapacities were linked to a great extent to the matrimonial
regime of community as to property, the legal regime applicable in the
absence of a marriage contract which governed in the great majority of
cases the financial arrangements between spouses. As head of the com-
munity property regime, the husband detained all the powers of an ad-
ministrator, even over property propre to his wife.53
Further proposals for reform were subsequently enacted in Bill 16
of 19645 and were hailed as one of the great monuments to the eman-
cipation of the married woman. Still, however, this newly acquired capacity
was given "under reserve only of restrictions arising from the matrimonial
regime and from the law." 55 The next step could not avoid dealing with
such matrimonial regime, "given the intimate link which exists between
the question of married women's legal capacity and that of the various
legal regimes.''56
49. Mayrand, The Quebec Civil Code: New Steps Towards Equality in Family Law,
in The Cambridge Lectures 4 (July 1983).
50. Que. Stat. ch. 101 (1930-1931) (adding Civ. Code Lower Can. arts. 1425,1425i).
51. Que. Stat. ch. 48, art. 3 (1954-1955).
52. Duchesneau v. Cook, 1955 S.C.R. 207; Comtois, 59 R. du Notariat 117, 119
(1956-1957).
53. See Civ. Code Lower Can. arts. 1298, 1272 as they existed prior to Que. Stat.
ch. 48 (1954-1955).
54. Que. Stat. ch. 66 (1964).
55. Civ. Code Lower Can. art. 177 (as it existed in 1964).




Four years later, the Minister of Justice was handed the C.C.R.O.'s
Report Committee on Matrimonial Regimes. 7 It became law the follow-
ing year58 as Title Four of Book Third of the Civil Code of Lower Canada,
entitled "Of Marriage Covenants and of the Effect of Marriage upon the
Property of the Consorts"; it has now become Chapter VII of Book Two
- The Family of the Quebec Civil Code. Apart from the modification
of the technique of compensation and the clarification of certain
characterizations of the property of consorts, the revision of that part
of the Code was mainly aimed at reflecting the principles of equality be-
tween consorts. It may be in order to have a glimpse at its principal
features.
In Quebec, then as now, no rigid and uniform matrimonial regime
is imposed on married persons. The law allows the consorts to choose,
by contract, the system best suited to their particular needs and provides
appropriate guidelines. In the absence of such choice by the spouses,
however, the so-called legal regime applies.
In 1866, the legal regime consisted of a community of moveables and
acquests with the husband as chief administrator and head of the family
unit. Marital and paternal authority flowed logically from this regime and,
as a necessary corollary, dependence of the wife both as a person and
in the management of her affairs as well as of those of the community
between her and her husband. This state of affairs sheds some light on
the reluctance of the legislature to grant married women full legal capa-
city: What would happen to the head of the community, on which stands
not only the whole philosophy but even the workability of the legal regime
of community as to property? Hence, full capacity of the married woman
came only with the complete reform of the matrimonial regimes.
Although it realized that the conventional regime of separation as to
property was favored by an increasing number of consorts and that a
legal regime of community as to property might be doomed, the C.C.R.O.
nevertheless remained convinced that separation as to property could result
in real prejudice for one of the consorts, even with built-in burdensome
safeguards. In Quebec, it was normal at that time for the wife to devote
all her time to the care of the family; under a separate property regime,
the wife in all of these cases would receive no share in the wealth ac-
57. Civil Code Revision Office, Report on Matrimonial Regimes (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Matrimonial Regimes]. The C.C.R.O. on Matrimonial Regimes was then chaired
by Notary Roger Comtois, later to become dean of the Faculty of Law of the University
of Montreal (1978-1981); other members included Professor Louis Baudouin and Notary
Andre Lesage (both now deceased) and M. Louis Marceau, Q.C., formerly dean of the
Faculty of Law, Laval Univeristy (1959-1969) and now a judge of the Federal Court of
Appeal of Canada.
58. Act respecting matrimonial regimes, Que. Stat. ch. 77 (1969) (now Que. Stat. ch.
39 (1980) (articles 463-524, as modified)).
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cumulated by the husband, and which she herself had often made possi-
ble, upon the dissolution of the marriage. Given the fact that more than
fifty percent of the married women in Quebec are now part of the paid
work force," one may question the validity of this concern, particularly
when more than fifty percent of the couples today prefer to marry under
the conventional regime of separation as to property."
In any event, the C.C.R.O.'s rationale in proposing the partnership
of acquests as the legal matrimonial regime was expressed in the follow-
ing terms:
Would it not be more suitable to promote between two per-
sons so intimately united in the pursuit of a common objective,
a certain community of interest from the time of the marriage
without, however, attempting to create a confusion, even partial,
of their patrimonies? It if were possible to organize a matrimonial
system which would, at the same time, respect the autonomy,
equality and independence of the two consorts, and permit each
to participate, at the dissolution of the regime, in the gains realized
in the course of its duration, would we not have a standard for-
mula achieving the desired objective and capable of rallying, as
it should, the support of the majority? These objectives are fun-
damentally reflected in the proposed legal regime, the partner-
ship of acquests.
9. This regime of partnership of acquests is drawn: on the one
hand, from the legal regime adopted in Sweden (the Marriage
Code of June 11, 1920), Denmark (law of March 18, 1925), Nor-
way (law of May 20, 1927), the Federal Republic of Germany
(law of June 18, 1957); and, on the other hand, from the regime
of participation in acquests of the 1932 French draft. But it dif-
fers from them on a certain number of important points. 6'
However, the partnership of acquests recommended by the C.C.R.O.
possessed a number of unique characteristics described as follows:
During the marriage, each consort retains the entire control of
his patrimony, and remains fully responsible for his debts: the
autonomy of each is complete, save for the obvious need that
each contribute, according to his means, to the needs of the
household. There is, therefore, no difficulty as to management.
59. 44,790 according to Statistics Canada, Active Population Series (Dec. 1980).
60. Rivet, La popularit6 des diff~rents regimes matrimoniaux depuis la rdforme de 1970,
15 C. de D. 613, 642 (1974). According to statistics from the Quebec Department of Justice,
there were 41,000 marriages in 1981, of which 53% chose the partnership of acquests, and
47% the separation as to property. This, of course, does not account for the couples living
in defacto unions (statistics are not available) who, in the absence of a partnership contract-
which is mostly the case-do not fall under the matrimonial regime.
61. Matrimonial Regimes, supra note 57, at 6-7.
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If by chance one of the consorts entrusts the administration of
his property to the other, the latter will be subjected to the general
rules respecting the contract of mandate, under which the man-
datary is obliged to render an account, save as to fruits received
which under an old rule article 1424 of the Quebec Civil Code,
that the draft renders applicable to all regimes new article 182,
will be presumed to have been consumed for the needs of the
household. It is only on the dissolution of the regime (by death,
separation from bed and board, separation of property) that a
part of the patrimony of each consort will become subject to par-
tition: that part which will have been made up of the proceeds
of his work during the course of the regime. Thus property
possessed before marriage or acquired subsequently by gratuitous
title will not be subject to partition, nor will the fruits and pro-
ceeds of this property, nor effects of a personal character such
as souvenirs or tools, implements or other things used in a trade
or a profession; but all other property that has not been estab-
lished by legal proof to be private property will be subject to par-
tition. And it is in value, and not in kind, that this partition will
take place if it is so preferred by the consort who is the holder
of the patrimony or his heirs.
11. The technical structure of this new regime will be set forth
in greater detail in the commentaries on the recommended texts,
but it can immediately be seen that, during its existence, it offers
all the advantages of separation of property, to which Quebec
consorts seem more and more attached. Without doubt the mode
of liquidation designed for carrying out the partition of the ac-
quests at the moment of dissolution will produce some difficulties;
but these are much curtailed and the fact that the partition may
be affected in value will forestall the breaking up of assets which
is at times so injurious. In any event, these technical inconven-
iences of implementation will incontestably be less than those under
any other regime, save of course pure and simple separation of
property which, in short, is equivalent to the absence of a regime."
This vision of the past, perhaps a little too long, seemed essential
to grasp the full dimension of the reforms which the Civil Code of Lower
Canada has undergone in the long march towards quality of the married
woman in the management of family affairs and in the upbringing,
maintenance, and education of the children of the marriage. The Quebec
Civil Code does achieve equality for the married woman in law, although
equality in the realm of everyday life within the family is beyond its reach.
Even though "le Code s'arrete au seuil des sentiments,"63 however, equality
62. Id. at 13-15 (footnote omitted).
63. M.T. Meuldersd-Klein, Famile, droit et changement social dans les socidtds con-
temporaines, in VI1e Journ~es d'6tudes juridiques Jean Dabin at 751 (Brussels 1978).
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in the realm of everyday faimly life is a desirable objective-true equality
breeds respect and consideration for the other, something no law can
achieve. Nevertheless, several provisions of the Quebec Civil Code insure
the equality of the married woman in the eyes of the law; these provi-
sions are examined below.
The Surname of the Married Woman
For the woman married after April 2, 1981,64 Article 442 of the
Quebec Civil Code provides: "In marriage, each spouse retains his sur-
name and given names, and exercises his civil rights under this surname
and these given names." This is a departure from the long-standing tradi-
tion, sanctioned by law in Quebec and shared with a number of western
countries, according to which the wife assumed the husband's surname
upon marriage, although she still had the right to use her maiden name.
One obvious advantage of the new rule is that it eliminates the contro-
versy surrounding the name of a divorcee. And while the new rule is linked
to the principle of equality of the spouses, it is also consistent with another
rule proposed by the C.C.R.O.: unchangeability of the names save under
exceptional circumstances and by petition to the Registrar of Civil Status
under the Change of Name Act.65
A number of questions-questions which the courts have not yet been
asked to answer-may arise in connection with the new rule. The first
and most obvious such question concerns the sanctions that should be
applied in case of an infraction: Can a contract entered into under the
husband's name by a woman married after April 2, 1981, be annulled
for that reason alone? Will the resolution depend on the good or bad
faith of the woman, or on that of the other party? Could the other party
obtain the annulment of the contract if it is proven that the "false" name
was used fraudulently to induce the passing of a contract which could
not have otherwise been consented to according to the rules governing
contracts?" Does the married woman designated under the name of her
husband have any recourse? Could she ignore legal proceedings instituted
against her under her husband's name? After divorce, is a woman mar-
ried before April 2, 1981, entitled to keep her former husband's surname,
particularly if she has always been known or has practiced her profession
under that name? And many other questions may eventually arise!
It is suspected that the solutions will be governed by principles firmly
engraved in our civil laws for infractions of a legal obligation, and that
this newly found "nominal" equality will not be used to render some
"more equal" than others. While the problems may be more theoretical
64. Que. Civ. Code art. 79.
65. Que. Stat. ch. 77 (1965); see 2 Commentaries supra note 28, at 6-7.
66. See Que. Civ. Code art. 993.
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than real as regards the married woman, however, the opposite may be
true where the surname of the children is concerned.
The Surname of the Children
The immemorial tradition required the child to bear his father's name,
but tradition and equality did not seem to "faire bon minage" [i.e., make
for good housekeeping] to the legislature, although it did to the C.C.R.O.
Perceived as a sign that pregnancy is still a woman's domain, the sur-
name of the child has now become a choice for both parents (or perhaps
for the judge in case of disagreement).67
Article 56.1 of the Civil Code of Lower Canada states: " A child
is assigned, at the option of his father and mother, one or more given
names, and the surname of one parent or a surname consisting of not
more than two parts, taken from the surnames of his father and mother."
Nothing compels the parents to choose the same surname for all of their
children, however. The C.C.R.O. had not given in to such a concept of
equality. The choice was a political one; the problems which may develop
as a result will be practical ones.
The Residence and Domicile of Spouses
When the husband had the right to choose the family residence and
the wife had the obligation to follow him wherever he thought fit to
reside, 68 no problem arose as to the family residence or as to the domicile
of the married woman. Old article 83 of the Civil Code of Lower Canada
had in effect provided that a married woman not separated as to bed
and board had no other domicile than that of her husband. According
to article 444 of the Quebec Civil Code, however, "[t]he spouses choose
the family residence together," and article 441 provides that "[tihey must
live together" (one of the rights and duties of spouses). New problems
have arisen with this new situation, however.
Since domicile 69 was a determining factor in establishing the jurisdic-
tion of Canadian courts 0 until the adoption of the concept of "habitual
residence" as suggested by the C.C.R.O.,7 ' and is still a determining fac-
tor in establishing the jurisdiction of the courts of other countries, it is
important to determine the domicile of the married woman, particularly
in private international law. When spouses live together in the same
residence, the domicile of the husband and wife poses no problem.
67. See id. art. 448.
68. See Civ. Code Lower Can. art. 175.
69. Domicile was defined as the place where a person had his principal establishment.
See id. art. 79.
70. See Que. Code Civ. P. arts. 68-75.
71. See I Report, supra note 5, art. 60, at 65.
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However, some difficulty may arise when the spouses, while not separated
nor divorced, have two residences and live either together in one or the
other or in separate residences. It is quite possible then for spouses living
together to have two distinct residences, and the domicile of each spouse
will be the residence where each has his principal establishment or, even-
tually, his habitual residence.
There are some exceptions to this rule that the domicile of each spouse
is the residence where that spouse has his principal establishment or
habitual residence, however. For example, the matrimonial regime that
applies to consorts without a marriage contract is determined by the law
of the matrimonial domicile of the consorts, and the jurisprudence at pre-
sent defines the matrimonial domicile of such consorts as the domicile
of the husband at the time of marriage.72 The C.C.R.O. (Book Nine of
the Draft Code, not yet enacted) proposes that where consorts married
without a marriage contract have no common domicile at the time of
their marriage, their matrimonial regime be governed by the law of "their
first common domicile, or, in the absence of such a domicile, by the law
of their common nationality, or, in the absence of one and the other,
by the law of the place where the marriage was solemnized." 3
Equal Rights and Duties of Spouses
Embodied in a series of articles under the main title "Effects of
Marriage," '74 Section 1, entitled "Rights and Duties of Spouses," reads
as follows:
Art. 441. The spouses have identical rights and obligations in
marriage.
They owe each other respect, fidelity, succour and assistance.
They must live together.
Art. 442. In marriage, each spouse retains his surname and
given names, and exercises his civil rights under this surname and
these given names.
Art. 443. The spouses together take in hand the moral and
material direction of the family, exercise parental authority and
assume the tasks resulting therefrom.
Art. 444. The spouses choose the family residence together.
Art. 445. The spouses contribute towards the expenses of the
marriage in proportion to their respective means.
72. 76 R. du N. 37 (1973); see also 2 Commentaries, supra note 28, at 94; statutes
cited supra note 32.
73. 1 Report, supra note 5, art. 26, at 598; see also 2 Commentaries, supra note 28,
at 978-79.
74. Que. Civ. Code bk. 2, tit. 1, ch. 6.
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Each spouse may make his contribution by his activity within
the home.
Art. 446. A spouse who enters into a contract for the current
needs of the family also commits his spouse for the whole, if
they are not separated as to bed and board.
However, the non-contracting spouse is not responsible for the
debt if he had previously informed the other contracting party
of his unwillingness to be committed.
Art. 447. Either spouse may give the other a mandate to repre-
sent him in acts relating to the moral and material direction of
the family.
This mandate is presumed if one spouse is unable to manifest
his intention for any reason or if he is unable to do so within
the proper time.
Art. 448. If the spouses disagree as to the exercise of their
rights and the performance of their duties, they or either of them
may apply to the court, which will decide in the interest of the
family after fostering the conciliation of the parties.
Two points should be made at the outset in regard to these articles.
First, these new provisions are imperative, whatever the matrimonial
regime. Article 440 declares that "[iun no case may spouses derogate from
the provisions of this chapter, whatever their matrimonial regime." This
makes for a true "primary regime" governing all consorts, even with
respect to household expenses, although the C.C.R.O. would have made
an exception to allow spouses more independence and freedom to make
such arrangements as their particular situation might warrant. In the words
of the Minister of Justice at the time Bill 89 was passed, it appeared more
in harmony with the principles of equality and collegiality not to make
exceptions to the rule of public order insofar as contributions to the
household expenses are concerned.
The second point deals with the conflict resolution process, a process
made necessary by the equality of the partners. As recognized in the
Report, recourse to the courts is far from the ideal solution, even when
that recourse is to a family court with conciliation facilities and is available
only as a last resort. Faced with no other viable alternative, however,
the C.C.R.O. chose the slight disadvantages of full equality of the con-
sorts over the less obvious advantages and unacceptable predominence of
one of the spouses over the other, hoping that spouses would attempt
to reconcile their differences in the best interest of the family rather than
face court proceedings." If one takes equality seriously, one must accept
its consequences. Nevertheless, this new legislation does not seem to have
75. 2 Commentaries, supra note 28, at 147.
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spurred any litigation since its effective date that was not already being
dealt with by the courts in suits for separation as to bed and board or
divorce.
Finally, solidary liability as to the debts incurred for the current needs
of the family was imposed on the consorts. The C.C.R.O. had rejected
this concept on the following basis:
Contrary to a frequently-stated opinion, it cannot be said that
joint and several liability supports equality between consorts. It
seems rather to threaten the contribution in kind introduced in
Article 47. A consort who contributes to the expenses of the mar-
riage by his activity in the home might find himself liable for
all the debts contracted by his spouse when he has no income
to meet them.
It was therefore considered preferable for the contracting con-
sort to commit himself personally and to commit his spouse only
in proportion to that spouse's means.76
Nevertheless, the legislature concluded that such solidarity did not threaten
the contribution in kind and a spouse obliged to pay had his recourse
against the other. It adopted solidarity between the consorts with respect
to debts incurred for the current needs of the family on the grounds that
third parties had no means of ascertaining the contribution of each spouse
to the current needs of the family and might therefore refuse credit to
the family to its disadvantage. Moreover, the spouse who does not want
to be held liable can announce his will to the third party. 77
Parental Authority
For almost one hundred years, authority over the children was vested
in the father alone-only in his absence or incapacity was the mother
considered a proper substitute to exercise this authority. Male domina-
tion persisted until 1977, when articles 242 and following of the Civil
Code of Lower Canada were adopted." New article 648 of the Quebec
Civil Code only confirms the provisions of those articles in the following
terms:
The father and mother exercise parental authority together.
If either parent dies, is deprived of parental authority or is
unable to express his will, the other parent exercises parental
authority."
76. Id. at 140-41.
77. Journal des debats (Commissions) 8, B-3893 (1969).
78. Que. Rev. Stat., ch. C-72, art. 4 (1977).
79. The C.C.R.O. had proposed to insert the following in the book "On Persons":
"Every child is entitled to the affection and security which his parents or those who act
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In only one circumstance can parental authority be exercised by one parent
alone: In the case of the marriage of a child under age, the consent of
one parent is sufficient." Should difficulties arise as to the exercise of
parental authority in situations other than those described in the second
paragraph of article 648, the matter can be referred to the court by one
of the parents.' In fact, the court even has the power, in the interest
of the child and for serious cause, to totally or partially deprive either
one or both parents of their parental authority; "2 those rights may be
restored on account of new circumstances, save in cases of adoption. "3
In all decisions in which a child is concerned, however, whether the deci-
sions are made by parents or courts, the child's best interest and respect
for his rights must be the determining factors.
4
The rule of the best interest of the child is as widely accepted as it
is known. However, what constitutes the best interest of the child remains
the difficult question. The limits of such a rule may pose problems when
the legitimate interests of the parents or of one of them may have to
be weighed against those of the child.
Can parents renounce parental authority in favour of a third person?
The Code only makes provision in article 649 for the power of parents
to delegate the custody, supervision and education of their children. Since
the parents are under a legal obligation to exercise their authority in the
best interest of the child, it is doubtful that they could free themselves
of that obligation or their liability for the damage caused by their minor
children 6 by such a renunciation, although a delegation of authority in'
accordance with article 649 of the Quebec Civil Code might facilitate
exoneration.
It should be noted here that the age of majority in Quebec was lowered
from twenty-one to eighteen in 1971.87 In addition, the Quebec Civil Code
raises the age of marriage from twelve for girls and fourteen for boys
in their stead are able to give him, in order to ensure the full development of his personal-
ity." I Report, supra note 5, bk. I, tit. 2, ch. 2, art. 24, at 9.
80. Civ. Code Lower Can. art. 119 (modified by Que. Stat. ch. 74, art. 1 (1969); id.
ch. 85, art. 1 (1971)).
81. Que. Civ. Code art. 653.
82. Id. art. 654.
83. Id. art. 658.
84. Civ. Code Lower Can. art. 30.
85. Que. Civ. Code art. 649.
86. Article 1054 of the Civil Code of Lower Canada provides in pertinent part:
[One] is responsible not only for the damage caused by his own fault, but also
for that caused by the fault of persons under his control and by things he has
under his care;
The person having parental authority is responsible for the damage caused by
the child subject to such authority.
The corresponding articles of the Louisiana Civil Code are articles 2317 and 2318.
87. Que. Stat. ch. 85, art. 1 (1971).
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to eighteen for both girls and boys, with a possibility of dispensation by
a judge, for serious reasons, between ages sixteen and eighteen."
EQUALITY BETWEEN CHILDREN
Under former legislation, a child born out of wedlock had no family
except perhaps his mother, whose name alone he was entitled to bear.
He could not inherit in intestate or ab intestate successions of his natural
father or mother. 9 And although there is complete freedom of testation
in Quebec, the use of the word "child" in testamentary successions was
not sufficient to include illegitimate children unless they had been so
specified." If, in addition, the illegitimate child had the misfortune to
be born out of an adulterous or incestuous relationship, his natural parents
could not even make donations to him other than those of an alimentary
nature.9
Even before the enactment of the new Quebec Civil Code, in answer
to pressures resulting from, among other things, a well-publicized case,
some rights were conferred upon natural parents and the children then
designated as illegitimate. In 1970, article 1056 of the Civil Code of Lower
Canada was amended to provide for a right of action by the natural child
against the person responsible for the death of his father or mother and
by the natural parents against the person responsible for the death of
their natural child. But it was only with the advent of the new Quebec
Civil Code that equality of such children was to be fully recongnized:
"All children whose filiation is established have the same rights and obliga-
tions, regardless of their circumstances of birth."9 2 There is one restric-
tion on the rights granted illegitimates with respect to inheritance, however;
such a child will be entitled to succeed his natural father or mother only
in estates opened since the adoption of the Quebec Civil Code. 3
In addition, since natural children are now viewed as equal to children
born of married parents, the Quebec Civil Code has eradicated even the
terms "natural" or "illegitimate," "incestuous," and "adulterous." All
are now simply "children."
There will always be children who are treated differently from others,
however. As a consequence of the freedom of will, a father, for instance,
is entitled to disinherit a child, a legitimate child; so can he disinherit
a natural child. More delicate is the question whether a will to "the
88. Que. Civ. Code arts. 402-403.
89. See Civ. Code Lower Can. arts. 624a, 624b, 625 (declaring that children inherit
from their parents).
90. Mayrand, Adoption et successibilit6, 1950 R. du B. 407, 442.
91. See Civ. Code Lower Can. art. 768 (repealed by Que. Stat. ch. 39, art. 35 (1980)).
92. Que. Civ. Code art 594.
93. Que. Stat. ch. 39, art. 72 (1980).
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children of my marriage" will be found in breach of public policy, given
the wording of article 594 of the Quebec Civil Code, or for that matter,
in breach of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms where discrimination
on the basis of "status" is prohibited. 91 One could argue that freedom
of will implies the ability to make such distinctions between children as
the testator wishes and that the language of article 594 is not directed
at distinctions drawn in specific, individual cases but at distinctions drawn
by the law at large, and in that sense can be interpreted as discriminatory.
SPECIAL MEASURES IN CASE OF INEQUALITIES
Equality all around has been proclaimed. Equality in law is not
necessarily equality in fact, however. In order to prevent or redress the
injustices which might result from de facto inequalities, it was felt necessary
to provide some mechanisms.
Two of these special measures will be dealt with here: (1) the protec-
tion of the family residence and household furniture in the interest of
the family; and (2) the compensatory allowance, which stems from the
economic dependence of one of the consorts.
The Protection of the Family Residence and Household Furniture
Under the old regime of community of property, a husband common
as to property could not sell, alienate, or hypothecate any immovable prop-
erty of the community and furniture in use by the household without
the consent of his wife. 5
The Quebec Civil Code considerably extends this rule by including
in the prohibition the lease of the dwelling used as family residence and
by making the rule applicable to both consorts whatever their matrimonial
regime.96 The technique consists in the registration of a declaration of
residence in the first case and the notification to the lessor in the second.
In addition, in case of separation as to bed and board or the dissolu-
tion or annulment of the marriage, the court may even transfer from one
spouse to the other the ownership of the household furniture used in the
family residence or the lease of the principal family residence.97 As a com-
pensation for the contribution to the enrichment of the patrimony of the
other, the court may also award to either spouse a right of ownership
or habitation of the immovable used as the principal residence of the
family, except that in the evefit of separation as to bed and board a right
94. Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, Que. Rev. Stat. ch. C-12, art. 10 (1977);
The (Canada) Constitution Act, 1982-The Charter of Rights and Freedoms art. 15.
95. See Civ. Code Lower Can. art. 1292.
96. Que. Civ. Code arts. 449-454.
97. Id. arts. 457-458.
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of habitation only may be awarded.98 In the first case, the award is made
according to conditions determined by the court, which may include pay-
ment of any balance in cash or by instalments.9
These measures follow the report of the C.C.R.O. to the Minister
of Justice in 1971, who at the time felt that the need to deal with the
growing problems stemming from the new Divorce Act of 1968 and the
introduction of the partnership of acquests as the new legal matrimonial
regime was a matter of some urgency. Under the old community prop-
erty regime and since June 1964,100 the family residence could not be
disposed of without the consent of both spouses; however, this was no
longer the case under either the partnership of acquests or the separation
as to property conventional regimes, after their adoption, and it had
become usual for husband in anticipation of divorce to sell the family
home during the divorce proceedings, at the time of divorce, or shortly
thereafter. Thus, the wife and children, already distressed by the divorce,
were often forced to give up the stability and convenience of a home
they sometimes had been living in for a number of years. This often
brought disastrous consequences, particularly for the children. It was in
response to the problems created by such inadequacies in the law that
the protection of the family residence seemed necessary.
The protection adopted covers not only the immovable of a residen-
tial nature at which the consorts have established their principal residence,
but also the dwelling rented for such purpose and the household furniture
garnishing such principal residence. It is embodied in the following articles:
Art. 449. Neither spouse may, without the consent of the
other, pledge, alienate or remove from the principal family
residence the household furniture used by the family.
Art. 450. If a spouse has not consented to an act concerning
any household furniture used in the principal family residence,
he may apply to have the act annulled, unless he has ratified it.
However, no act by onerous title may be annulled if the other
contracting party was in good faith.
Art. 451. Neither spouse, if the lessee of the principal family
residence, may, without the written consent of the other, sublet
it, transfer it or terminate the lease where the lessor has been
notified, by either of them, that the dwelling is used as the prin-
cipal residence.
If the other spouse has not consented to the act, he may apply
to have it annulled, unless he has ratified it.
98. Id. art. 459.
99. Id. art. 460.
100. An Act respecting the legal capacity of married women, Que. Stat. ch. 66 (1964).
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Of course, difficulties could arise in cases where a consort owns a
multiple dwelling in which an apartment is used as the principal family
residence. The line was drawn for immovables with fewer than five dwell-
ings. Special rules apply to those with more than five dwellings. These
are reflected in articles 452 and 453 of the Quebec Civil Code.
Art. 452. Neither spouse, if the owner of an immoveable with
fewer than five dwellings that is used in whole or in part as the
principal family residence, may, without the consent of the other,
alienate the immoveable, charge it with a real right or lease that
part of it reserved for the use of the family.
Unless he has ratified the act, the spouse who has not con-
sented may apply to have it annulled if a declaration of residence
has been previously registered against the immoveable.
Art. 453. Neither spouse, if the owner of an immoveable with
five dwellings or more that is used in whole or in part as the
principal family residence may, without the consent of the other,
alienate the immoveable or lease that part of it reserved for the
use of the family.
Where a declaration of residence has been previously registered
against the immoveable, the spouse who has not consented to the
deed of alienation may require the acquirer to lease to him the
premises already occupied for residential purposes on the condi-
tions governing the lease of a dwelling; under the same condi-
tion, the spouse who has not consented to the act of lease may
apply to have it annulled, unless he has ratified it.
As regards third parties, a registered declaration of residence is the
mechanism which implements the protection: "The declaration of residence
is made by both spouses or by either of them. Where the declaration
is made by the spouse of the owner of the residence, he must notify the
latter immediately.''
Article 456 provides for a court authorization in cases where the con-
sent of one spouse is unobtainable or his refusal is not justified by the
interest of the family.
Art. 456. Either spouse may be authorized by the court to
enter alone into any act for which the consent to the other would
be required, provided such consent is unobtainable for any reason,
or its refusal is not justified by the interest of the family.
The authorization is special and for a definite time; it may be
amended or revoked.
But the law goes much further, allowing the court, under conditions it
101. Id. art. 455.
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determines and whatever the matrimonial regime of the parties,' 2 to award
the consort who is not the owner or the surviving spouse: (1) the owner-
ship or use of the household furniture, in the event of separation as to
bed and board or the dissolution or annulment of marriage;103 and (2)
a right of ownership or habitation of the immoveable used as the prin-
cipal family residence in case of dissolution or annulment of marriage
in case of separation as to bed and board, or a right of habitation as
compensation for his or her contribution to the enrichment of the
patrimony of the other.' 4 A judgment awarding such rights is equivalent
to title, with the same effects.'0 5
This, of course, had given rise to a number of legal problems. In
particular, in cases of divorce, when the interest of one of the spouses
is to sell the principal residence and the interest of the other is to retain
possession and ownership of the residence, it has forced bargaining and
the conclusion of separation agreements which, in practice, often result
in the sharing between consorts of the net proceeds of the sale. In cases
of bankruptcy, it has raised the problem of the entitlement of the trustee
to proceed with the sale of the principal family residence. 06 The net result
is that between consorts the provisions of matrimonial regimes have become
more or less "lettre morte."
Is the registration of a declaration of residence a real right? A right
in rem? Since personal rights are not subject to registration, what is the
effect of such registration? At what time should the declaration be
registered? At the time of purchase? What is the sanction if an act is
made in breach of those regulations? Is the act an absolute or relative
nullity? Who can invoke it? Do articles 452 and 453 prohibit the sale
of a multiple-dwelling immovable in the absence of the consent of one
of the consorts if the dwelling used as principle residence is excluded?
Is there no right of sale? Can the immovable be mortaged?
These and a number of other questions are still unanswered, and will
no doubt be a source of litigation for years to come. But much of the
litigation, it seems, will be brought on by the provisions relating to the
compensatory allowance.
The Compensatory Allowance
The provision establishing the compensatory allowance reads as
follows:
102. Id. art. 460.
103. Id. art. 458.
104. Id. art. 459.
105. Id. art. 462.
106. See Camille Charron, La residence familiale, gage des creanciers de son proprietaire,
43 R. du B. 774 (1983); Vezina, La residence familiale et la faillite du proprietaire, 42
R. du B. 828 (1982).
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Art. 559. The court, in granting a divorce, may order either
spouse to pay to the other, as consideration for the latter's con-
tribution, in goods or services, to the enrichment of the patrimony
of the former, an allowance payable immediately or by in-
stalments, taking into account, in particular, the advantages of
the matrimonial regime and marriage contract.
The compensatory allowance may be paid, wholly or in part,
by the granting of a right of ownership, use or habitation in ac-
cordance with articles 458 to 462.
This article is an important expansion on the theory of unjust enrichment
to remedy inequalities in the facts.
One final element must be established before the court can order pay-
ment of a compensatory allowance: There must be an enrichment of one
spouse and an unrecompensed contribution of the other. This require-
ment gives rise to a number of questions: When can the claim be made
after divorce? From what moment does the determination take place? What
if the fortune is lost at the time of claiming? Can one renounce the com-
pensatory allowance by marriage contract? Is such right to a compen-
satory allowance transmitted to the heirs of the consort? In addition, the
words "goods" and "services" are extremely comprehensive, raising fur-
ther questions: Must the contribution be a direct one or is it sufficient
that it did contribute indirectly to the enrichment of the other? How should
such compensatory allowance be paid? Would the debtor have an option
or choice as to the methods of payment? What criteria will prevail in
order to determine the methods of payment?
As for the debtor of such compensatory allowance, the Civil Code
of Lower Canada provides:
Art. 735.1 The heirs or legatees discharge, in the same man-
ner as for all other debts and liabilities of the succession, the
allowance awarded to the surviving spouse as compensation for
his contribution, in goods or services, to the enrichment of the
patrimony of the deceased spouse.
The allowance is fixed taking into account, particularly, the ad-
vantages allowed to the surviving spouse by the matrimonial
regime, the marriage contract and the succession; the allowance
is payable immediately or by instalments.
The allowance is fixed taking into account, particularly, the ad-
vantages allowed to the surviving spouse by the matrimonial
regime, the marriage contract and the succession; the allowance
is payable immediately or by instalments.
The compensatory allowance may be paid, wholly or in part,
by the awarding of a right of ownership, use or habitation, in
accordance with articles 458 to 462 of the Civil Code of Quebec.
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Art. 2261.2 The application by a surviving spouse for the fix-
ing of the allowance due to him as compensation for his con-
tribution to the enrichment of the property of his deceased spouse
is prescribed by one year from the death of the spouse.
A long list of problems will confront the courts in the application
of the articles recognizing the compensatory allowance; the purpose here,
however, is not to try to resolve these problems, but only to underline
the complexity of the new reform. Equality before the law and in the
application of the law to various fact patterns raises difficult, if not at
times insoluble, problems, and at the very least requires that courts be
prepared to deal with such problems in the best interests of all concerned.
The C.C.R.O., conscious of its responsibility in this regard, did not en-
visage such reforms without at the same time suggesting a reform in the
courts dealing with family law, particularly in light of the emphasis in
the new Civil Code on the conciliation of issues between consorts. To
this end, the C.C.R.O. proposed that integrated family courts be created.
FAMILY COURTS
Convinced that a reform of substantive family law would be in-
complete and less effective without a reorganization of the judicial system
in such matters, the C.C.R.O. set up a committee in June, 1970, to study
the expediency of instituting a family court in Quebec. On February 3,
1975, the committee submitted its report to the Commissioner. The Report
on the Family Court was presented to the Minister of Justice in June,
1978, at the same time the Report on the Quebec Civil Code was submit-
ted by the C.C.R.O. In the foreword to the C.C.R.O. Report on the
Quebec Civil Code, Professor Cr~peau expressed the following view:
The success of the reform will, of course, depend upon the doc-
trinal and judicial interpretation given it; it will also depend on
the setting up of a Family Court dispensing justice in a manner
that recognizes the special characteristics of family disputes...
Objectives
The committee was composed of representatives of the Quebec Depart-
ments of Justice and Social Affairs as well as members of committees
of the C.C.R.O., judges, lawyers, and law professors. It held thirty-two
full meetings and consulted specialists in many fields, such as psychiatrists,
psychologists, social workers, marriage counsellors, probation officers,
lawyers and judges. It also attended the meetings of other law reform
bodies in Canada, and some of its members visited the family courts of
Toledo, Ohio and Detroit, Michigan. In short, the committee studied a
number of diverse proposals submitted by various bodies and individuals.
107. 1 Report, supra note 5, at p. xxxvi.
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The committee was familiar with the substantive changes in family
law proposed by the C.C.R.O., as well as the C.C.R.O.'s analysis of ex-
isting family problems in Quebec and its appraisal of the social and judicial
services available to Quebec families and the inadequacies in the administra-
tion of family justice. It concluded that current solutions were partial,
inappropriate, and even contradictory due to the division of jurisdiction,
the rigidity of the adversary system, the lack of coordination, and inade-
quate collaboration between psychosocial and legal family services. Pro-
moting an overall approach to family problems, the committee put for-
ward the creation of an integrated family court in the following terms:
The present system of administering family justice leaves much
to be criticized. To compensate for its deficiencies and ensure that
comprehensive, effective and dynamic justice is provided, the
organization and role of the courts which hear family matters must
be redefined to:
1. humanize and personalize the legal process in family
matters;
2. make the legal system and auxiliary court services ac-
cessible and efficient;
3. reach settlements which take the interest and rights of
each family member into account;
4. create an atmosphere favorable to calm and dignified
settlement of family conflicts;
5. appraise the conflict in all its aspects and identify the
underlying problems;
6. prevent permanent breaks, whenever possible, and pro-
mote conciliation of the parties in conflict;
7. enforce court decisions more efficiently;
8. promote self-assessment of the court system with a view
to making changes in structure and substantive law,
when necessary;
9. make the Court open to the community so as to ob-
tain the interest and the confidence of the general
public.
THE CREATION OF A FAMILY COURT
The Committee believes that the best means of attaining these
goals and adequately meeting the needs of the population is to
establish a Family Court dedicated to finding solutions and mak-
ing decisions in the best interests of the family concerned rather
than sanctioning one person's rights with no concern for the con-
sequences this may have for those of others.
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Thus the Family Court would have both social and legal
functions.
In its social capacity, the Family Court would work through
its specialized auxiliary services to evaluate conflicts submitted to
it; it would offer aid and assistance to re-unite the family, where
possible, or at least to reduce any harmful effects an inevitable
break-up might have; it would ensure that children involved in
proceedings obtain the care and supervision necessary for their
development within the family, or, if they must be withdrawn
from the family, treatment equivalent to that to which they were
entitled from their parents.
When no settlement is possible out of court, the Family Court
would exercise its delicate judicial function, attempting to main-
tain, while respecting the rule of law, a fair balance between the
interests and rights of each person involved in the conflict.
To fully assume its social and legal responsibilities, the Family
Court must:
1. be essentially a court of justice;
2. be presided over by specialized judges;
3. have integrated jurisdiction in all matters inherent to
family law;
4. be provided with specialized auxiliary services;
5. be able to function under procedure better adapted to
new behavioural science techniques and to the specific
nature of family problems.'
After first discussing the advantages of an administrative body over
a court of justice, the committee ultimately concluded that "the legal
system remains the best means of ensuring impartiality and respect of
individual rights."' 9 However, the committee did recommend a number
of changes in the existing court system to enable it to administer family
justice in the best possible way. The committee first recommended that
"A Family Court be created in the Province of Quebec with jurisdiction
in all family matters, presided over be [sic] specialized judges, assisted
by specialized auxiliary services and governed by procedural rules specifi-
cally adapted to the nature of family conflicts." ' "
108. Civil Code Revision Office, Report on the Family Court 32-34 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Family Court] (footnotes omitted).
109. Id. at 36.
110. Id. at 249 (citations omitted).
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Jurisdiction of the Family Court
The committee was most concerned with, the fact that, in Quebec,
family law was applied by five different courts: (1) the Superior Court
(a court of original jurisdiction); (2) the Court of the Sessions of the Peace
(concerned with refusal to support, incest, abandonment of children, cor-
ruption of children, and assault, whether between consorts or between
parents and children); (3) the municipal courts (particularly of the City
of Montreal, with a specialized jurisdiction in family conflicts); (4) the
Social Welfare Court (now the Youth Tribunal, whose jurisdiction ex-
tends not only to minors in need of protection and delinquents, but to
adults contributing to the delinquency of minors); and (5) the Provincial
Court (in certain matters of family law). Each of these courts operated
with its own rules of procedure, and some of them had overlapping
jurisdictions. This presented many disadvantages, not the least of which
was the lack of unity of philosophy in dispensing family justice. The
mutiplicity of procedures, the possibility of contradictory judgments, uncer-
tainty as to jurisdiction, and loss of time and money for the litigants
were sources of problems and frustration.
This unsatisfactory state of affairs, underlined on many occasions in
the past," ' led the committee to recommend the creation of a unique
court with integrated jurisdiction over all family matters, a court headed
by specialized judges, operating under flexible rules of procedure especially
adapted to those types of conflicts and supplemented with all the necessary
specialized auxiliary services. Family matters was to be defined to include
all personal and financial relations between consorts and between parents
and children, whether these relations existed within the framework of a
legal family or a de facto union. This was in accord with the substantive
reforms in family law proposed by the C.C.R.O. recognizing de facto
unions and the full rights of children, regardless of the circumstances of
their birth.'" Penal matters and matters relating to members of the family
should also be within the competence of the family court because they
are closely related to family matters. If this were the case, all conflicts
or matters arising within a family, whether between parents, parents and
children, or involving children, could be dealt with by the same court.
Although these matters might be handled in different administrative sec-
tions of the court (civil or penal), the same auxiliary services would be
available and the matters would be disposed of by or under the same
judges and imbued with the same philosophy and unity of direction.
The committee thus made the following recommendations as to the
jurisdiction of the family court:
I 11. See, e.g., Mathieu, Le besoin d'une cour de la famille A Montreal, 6 R. du B.
284 (1946).
112. Family Court, supra note 108, at 45.
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2. THAT a Family Court be established with exclusive original
jurisdiction in first instance in matters of family law.
3. THAT the Family Court include two administrative sections:
a civil section and a penal section.
4. THAT the civil section of the Family Court have jurisdic-
tion over the following matters:
A. Relations between consorts:
- marriage,
- separation as to bed and board,
- divorce,
- annulment or nullity of marriage,
- recourse in cases of disagreement between consorts,
- recourse for support,
- reciprocal execution of maintenance orders,
- dissolution of matrimonial regimes,
- judicial separation as to property,
- conventional modifications to matrimonial regimes,
- protection of the family residence.
B. Relations between parents and children:
- repudiation and contestation of paternity,
- judicial acknowledgment of paternity or maternity,
- lying-in costs,
- recourse for support following acknowledgment of pater-
nity or maternity,
- adoption,
- custody of children,
- obligation to support children,
- legal dispensation by reason of age for marriage,
- parental authority,
- tutorship of persons of minor age.
C. Other matters:
- judicial youth protection,
- protection of incapable persons of full age,




- relations between de facto consorts,
- civil status,
- changes of name made under the provisions of the Civil
Code respecting correction of records and registers of civil
status, and filiation, or under the Adoption Act,
- habeas corpus to recover custody of a child of minor age,
- the law on successions,
- any other matter attributed to the Family Court by special
statute.
5. THAT the penal section of the Family Court have jurisdic-
tion over the following matters:
A. Offences committed by an adult:
- refusal to support,
- incest,
- sexual intercourse with step-daughter or adoptive daughter,
- father, mother or tutor who causes defilement,
- corruption of children endangering morals,
- abandonment of a child,
- serious acts of violence between consorts or between
parents and children,
- abduction of a female under the age of sixteen,
- abduction of a child under the age of fourteen,
- theft by consort, while living apart, of an object belonging
to his spouse.
B. Offences committed by a child:
- Juvenile Delinquents Act,
- offences against provincial statutes or municipal by-laws
committed by children under the age of eighteen.
6. THAT Section 168 Cr. C. (corruption of children endanger-
ing morals) be amended so that the mere fact of a consort living
in de facto union in the presence of his children is not enough
by itself to constitute a criminal act.
7. THAT the Family Court have the power to refer certain
cases of juvenile delinquency according to the criteria of the
Juvenile Delinquents Act to ordinary criminal courts, as well as
cases of criminal offences over which it would have jurisdiction,
if the gravity of the offences justified this, taking all the cir-
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cumstances into account, and if the court considered that it could
not deal adequately with the case with the means at its disposal." 3
The Constitutional Problem
Because of the constitutional rules which govern the organization and
working of our judicial system, these recommendations were bound to
raise various constitutional problems. Without entering into details, suf-
fice it to say that there exists under the British North America Act, 1867
and The Constitutional Act, 1982 a division of powers between the federal
government and the provinces with respect to judicial organization. The
Federal Parliament has complete authority over its own judicial
organization-the Supreme Court of Canada and the Federal Court-and
it also has responsibility for the appointment, removal, salaries, pensions
and allowances of all judges of superior, district and county courts." 4
Although provinces have the power to create and change their own judicial
structure, determine the jurisdiction of such structures in provincial mat-
ters (civil or penal), appoint their own judges, and establish courts to
apply criminal law, as well as the responsibility of the administration of
justice in the province,'" provinces do not have the power to give their
own courts jurisdiction over matters which, at the time of Confederation
in 1867, were similar or analogous to matters then within the jurisdiction
of a Superior Court." 6 Since most of the body of family law was within
the jurisdiction of the superior courts in 1867, it follows that provinces
could not confer granted jurisdiction on all matters relating to family law
on a provincially created family court. This has been and still is the ma-
jor obstacle to the creation of family courts in Quebec.
Well aware of these impediments, the committee set forth several alter-
native proposals designed to meet the constitutional problems: (1) crea-
tion of a family court by the Province of Quebec with attribution by
Parliament of federal jurisdiction, and adoption by Parliament of rules
of procedure in federal matters as well as adoption by Quebec of rules
of procedures in provincial matters (this would require cooperation be-
tween both levels of government); (2) appointment of judges by Quebec,
on the condition that the family court be allotted full jurisdiction over
family matters analogous to that exercised by the courts of superior
jurisdiction in 1867; (3) conferral of jurisdiction by Quebec upon judges
appointed by the Parliament of Canada; (4) appointment by the federal
113. Id. at 249-52 (citations omitted).
114. British North America Act, 1867 §§ 96-101, in G. Wiktor & G. Tanguay, Constitu-
tions of Canada: Federal and Provincial at A72 (1978).
115. Id. §§ 92(4), 91(27), 92(14).
116. See Crevier & The Attorney General of the Province of Quebec, 2 S.C.R. 220 (1981);
Re Residential Tenancies Act, 1979, 1 S.C.R. 714 (1981); Attorney General of Quebec v.
Farrah, 2 S.C.R. 638 (1978); Tomko v. Labour Relations Board (N.S.), 1 S.C.R. 112 (1977).
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government of family court judges, which would entail no constitutional
problem.'
Structure
When the framework within which such an integrated Family Court
should be established was considered, the discussion focused upon which
of three alternatives would be most conducive to accomplishment of the
aims pursued: the creation of an autonomous court, the establishment
of a special division within an existing court, or the integration of the
Youth Tribunal into a more homogeneous court. The pros and cons of
each of these structural solutions were discussed. It was felt that the "crea-
tion of a special division within an already existing court would probably
lead to attainment of most of the results sought."''8 Under the present
constitutional framework, this division would have to be set up within
a court of superior jurisdiction, one in which judges are appointed by
the Parliament of Canada, ' 9 with Quebec having complete freedom to
designate such divisions as "Family Court."
This would be of great advantage to the litigants because it would
solve the problem of split jurisdiction for them-they would know where
to appear to press their claims. In addition, it would eliminate the delicate
questions that arise with respect to the delimitation of jurisdiction if pro-
per legislation were enacted, because "the Superior Court in Quebec is,
at least in civil matters, the court of original general jurisdiction entrusted
with all matters not expressly conferred upon another court."",0 Finally,
fewer problems would arise with respect to the legal status of the court
than would arise in the case of an "autonomous court."'. Since Quebec's
Report on the Family Court, a number of unified family courts with more
or less integrated jurisdiction in family law matters have been created in
Canada, each one offering special features."'
The Committee dealt further with the organization of the family court
and the procedure before the family court, to fit the notion of an ideal
family court with integrated jurisdiction under the authority of a single
court of justice, independently of the options chosen for the structure
of the proposed court.
117. For a full discussion of those proposals, see Family Court, supra note 108, at 59-98.
118. Id. at 101.
119. British North America Act, 1867 § 96, in G. Wiktor & G. Tanguay, supra note 114.
120. Family Court, supra note 108 at 102-03.
121. Id. at 103.
122. At present, there are unified family courts in Ontario (Hamilton), Saskatchewan
(Saskatoon), and New Brunswick (St. John and Fredericton). See Canada Department of
Justice, Attempting to Restructure Family Law-Unified Family Courts Experiments in
Canada (Aug. 1983). Integrated family courts are also operating in British Columbia and
Prince Edward Island, and another such project is likely to materialize in Manitoba in 1984.
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Starting with the assumption that "[no] consolidation of family
jurisdiction within a new court. . . having a well-defined identity would
in itself guarantee the success of the proposed reform,"' 23 the Committee
stated:
If the Family Court is to succeed, this will depend greatly on the
competence and dedication of its multidisciplinary team and on
collaboration among the various services working with the Court.
For this reason, it is important that the persons called upon
to work with it: judges, mediators, lawyers, and the professional
workers attached to the specialized auxiliary services of the Family
Court fulfil certain requirements, from the point of view of pro-
fessional training and interest, according to the objectives pur-
sued, that each one's duties be clearly defined, and that coor-
dination techniques be set up to ensure the indispensable com-
munication among the various elements of the Family Court, and
also between the Court itself and the government authorities
concerned.'14
It went on to define the particular roles of each of the persons and ser-
vices called upon to work within such framework.
The Personnel
The two-fold judicial and social role a Family Court judge would
be called upon to assume, in the view of the Committee pointed to special
care and consideration as to his selection. As a prerequisite (Superior Court
judges in Canada are nominated during good conduct by the Federal
authorities, and must have been members of the Bar for ten years), the
Family Court Judge should be a jurist, whether a lawyer or a notary,
and, in the opinion of most members of the Committee, a member of
the Bar for at least ten years, chosen preferably among specialists in family
law, and taking into account their interest in child and family matters.
The Committee suggested that once appointed, the judge be subjected
to special training in order to familiarize himself with the court's
philosophy and services. It also discussed the role of the Chief Justice
of the Family Court who, in addition to his traditional administrative
duties, would assume tasks of management, coordination and personnel
training, as well as public relations.
One of the interesting features of the Report concerns the mediator,
a figure unknown until now to our traditional court system. In formulating
its recommendations in that respect, the Committee stated:
As a general rule, traditional courts have, until very recently,




treated family disputes like any other dispute of a purely
patrimonial nature. The system of proof and hearing of cases in
particular has been strongly criticized for its slowness, inefficiency
and formalism, and for the loss of time and money incurred by
the parties, their attorneys, the judges and the witnesses, not to
mention the many frustrations of the persons called to appear
who must sometimes wait long hours before being heard. These
criticisms are even sharper with regards to family cases, because
of the nature of the conflicts.
At present, our courts are overflowing with applications for
determination of domicile, child custody, support payments and
the increase or reduction of those payments. Certain legal practi-
tioners feel that approximately 75o of the work, in each district
Practice Court consists in hearing such applications.
Considering these problems, the Committee has attempted to
draw up a formula that would meet the following objectives:
1. humanization of the judicial process and encouragment
of conciliation of disputes between consorts;
2. reduction of formalism resulting from formal hearings
and the use of the adversary system when the person
called to appear first encounters legal proceedings;
3. maximum use of the negotiating process specifically for
provisional and accessory measures;
4. a more rational use of judicial services.
In various fields of law, both in Canada and abroad, ex-
periments have been made in an effort to attain the goals men-
tioned above. Such is the case specifically for the investigation
commissioner in labour relations, the Master in Ontario and the
Referee in certain American family courts. These judicial officers
are more easily accessible than traditional judges. If such cases
are heard before these judicial officers, there is also the advan-
tage that such hearings are less formal than those conducted before
a judge; this encourages mediation of conflicts at a stage in the
proceedings where there is no risk of harming the rights of the
parties.
The Committee is of the opinion that the public should have
new machinery at its disposal intended to encourage negotiation
of family conflicts and more active participation of the parties
in making decisions, specifically in matters of separation as to
bed and board or of divorce. The mediator would assume this
new function.' 5
125. Id. at 122-24 (footnotes omitted).
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As for the mediator's nomination, constitutional constraints were
pointed out as well as the necessity to ensure his autonomy and perma-
nency of tenure. The mediator should be a lawyer or notary specialized
in family law, and have been practicing for at least five years.
The mediator's jurisdiction was -set out as follows:
The mediator would take cognizance of provisional and ac-
cessory measures concerning separation as to bed and board,
divorce, and annulment of marriage, with a view to promoting
amicable settlements of disputes between parties if possible. He
would also hear applications for homologation of agreements be-
tween consorts concerning child custody and support, so as to
be sure that these arrangements respect the child's interest and
that any support decided on by mutual agreement is sufficient
for the children and for the consort entitled to support.
The mediator should have the power necessary to obtain infor-
mation useful for clear, enlightened understanding of the various
elements of the case. In this way, he could call the parties and
any other persons designated by him, require that they file
documents pertinent to the case, summon witnesses, and even
order a social investigation if necessary, proprio motu or at the
request of the parties. He would inform the parties of their right
to be accompanied by their attorneys. There should be close
cooperation between attorneys and the mediator to complete the
record for the purpose of the hearing and to shorten it by admis-
sions concerning the parties' income, the children's age and any
other uncontested facts.
Following proof and hearing, the mediator would render an
executory order which could be reviewed within ten days at the
request of either party.
The mediator would also exercise the powers assigned to the
prothonotary of the Superior Court in family matters.12 6
All through the' Committee's report, the right to legal counsel for
any person involved in legal proceedings before the Family Court was
stressed, and this at every stage of the process:
The presence of a lawyer at the Family Court is in itself a
guarantee of respect for the due process of law. He must play
various, frequently incompatible roles in the discharge of his
duties; each function, therefore, should be well defined and
assumed by a different person. The duties of Crown attorney and
of legal adviser to the Admission Service might be alternately per-
formed by lawyers working with the Family Court, on condition,
126. Id. at 125 (footnotes omitted).
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however, that the performance of such duties be regulated so as
to ensure that the persons before the courts be protected from
all prejudicial indiscretion. It would therefore be of the utmost
importance that no lawyer appointed to a case in the Admission
Service be allowed to act as Crown attorney on the same case.
The lawyer's participation would prove even more valuable since
he would be aware of the procedure and objectives of the Family
Court and would work in conjunction with his specialized Court
colleagues. He would not, however, assume any responsibility
beyond his professional competence.' 27
Should the specialized auxiliary services form an integral part of the
Family Court system? On this question, the Committee suggested a com-
promise solution between those who advocate that such services be com-
pletely independent of the court and others who considered that they
should be integrated in to the Family Court:
The Committee considers that the Admission Service, the In-
vestigation Service and the Collection Service are all essential to
the Family Court. The same holds good for family counselling
services and basic clinical services. The other services offered could
be provided by community social services which should appoint
an officer for liaison with the Court. These services should not
be too widely separated geographically, however, so as to avoid
reduction of their accessibility and availability.
The specialized auxiliary services attached to the Family Court
should be administratively independent. In this respect, it should
be emphasized that whatever means ensure that these specialized
auxiliary services are provided for the Family Court, whether by
the creation of a new body, by way of contracts for services with
existing organizations or by the establishment of services directly
attached to the court, these services must be administratively in-
dependent of judicial authority and responsible for keeping and
managing their files and for access to these files according to the
rules of confidentiality proper to each.
The specialized auxiliary services of the Family Court would
include:
1. the Admission Service (Intake);
2. the Family Counselling Service;
3. the Investigation Service;
4. the Clinical Service;
5. the Probation Service and Child Services;
127. Id. at 136.
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6. the Support Collection Service.'2
Defining the role of each of those services, the Committee stressed
its accessibility and confidentiality, the quality and training of the per-
sonnel, the efficiency and coordination of all such services, as well as
the duties resorting to each one. The overall concern was so stated:
Every professional called upon to participate in the administra-
tion of Family Justice would have to make his own contribution
toward a smoother and more human settlement of family prob-
lems and toward more effective protection of the most vulnerable
members of the family, especially minors.
If an overall approach is to be achieved in the understanding
and settlement of family problems however, this contribution must
be associated with a combined search for what is best for the
persons concerned; this objective cannot be attained without close
collaboration from each professional involved, or without the ac-
tive participation of those brought before the courts. '
Procedure
Turning to the procedure before the Family Court, the assumptions
underlying the changes recommended are to be found in the following
extract of the Report:
Revision of substantive law and reorganization of the judicial
structures are certainly two important aspects of the reform of
family justice, but this reform would be incomplete unless ac-
companied by a re-examination of, and basic changes to, the rules
of procedure intended to give effect to the law and assure proper
functioning of the new forms. The task is to adapt the rules of
procedure to the new philosophy of the Family Court so that ef-
forts to promote amicable settlement of family conflicts and to
reduce barren confrontation and antagonisms will have a chance
of success.
The Committee has thus been led to propose certain changes
in present procedure and to suggest adoption of new rules better
suited to the special nature of family justice.
The main objective of the Committee was to ensure that the
rules of procedure offered a better balance between the rigidity
of the adversary system, which governs hearing of trials at the
present time, and the degree of flexibility required to solve family
problems in all their psycho-social and juridical aspects.
128. Id. at 138-39 (footnotes omitted).
129. Id. at 174.
1620 [Vol. 44
FAMILY LA W
Flexible, non-contentious rules to promote negotiation and con-
ciliation in quiet discussion are required while the problem is be-
ing examined, its causes analyzed and solutions studied. Once these
efforts fail however, and the trial must take its normal course,
then the adversary system must be scrupulously applied to ensure
absolute respect for the rights of all parties.
The broad discretion that would be given the Court in matters
of family law will moreover require submission of objective
elements of proof to enable the Court to hand down a more
enlightened decision, just as the special nature of family conflicts
will impose limitations on the confidentiality of discussions and
files.130
Principally in matters relating to child custody, support, protection
of the family residence, and division of property as a result of separation
as to bed and board, divorce or annulment of marriage, the Committee
was of the opinion that the Family Court should handle all requests for
help in matters within its jurisdiction, even in the absence of prior judicial
proceedings, the objective being to put at the disposal of couples with
marital difficulties services which might be of help in avoiding a worsen-
ing of the situation. This, of course, would be purely on a voluntary basis
and as a service to the consorts, and would be mostly of an informative
and consultive nature.
As to the rules of procedure themselves, in line with its objectives
of facilitating the assessment of family problems and of promoting con-
ciliation of disputes between consorts, the Report stresses the initial non-
contentious approach, the more formal and adversary procedure to be
resorted to only after attempts at conciliation have failed. The proposed
two-step procedure is described as follows:
The initial motion for separation or for divorce would com-
prise a single request to the Court: namely that it investigate the
viability or failure of the marriage. Incidental applications would
be attached to this one; and any agreements between the two par-
ties could also be annexed.
Only after the assessment interview and within ten days after
deposit of a certificate attesting to the failure of conciliation ef-
forts, would the applicant, if he wished to continue proceedings,
furnish the Court and the opposite party with precise details of
the application. Failing this, the defendant could ask for the details
by way of motion, or submit his own defence or his cross action,
for which the delays would have been suspended to permit the
initial assessment interview.
130. Id. at 195-96.
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Should the initial assessment interview lead to a reconciliation
or to further interviews with a marriage counsellor, submission
of details of the application would be suspended until there had
been deposited in the file a certificate of non-conciliation by the
marriage counsellor, or a notice by one of the parties that it wished
to terminate conciliation. Details of the application should then
be supplied within ten days after service of this notice or of the
certificate of non-conciliation. This delay would not be mandatory,
and could be met at any time before filing of the defence; it could
also be extended by the Court, unless the opposite party were
to raise reasonable objections. 3 '
Full disclosure of information at the outset seemed essential to pro-
vide the court and the auxiliary services with prime information in order
to permit a rapid appraisal of the situation, avoid unnecessary steps, and
establish the parameters of intervention by the court. If used systematically,
the information form would facilitate the establishing of statistics and,
more importantly, facilitate the results of the initial assessment interview.
Together with the intervention of the mediator, the initial assessment
interview is the central point (the "pivot") of the whole Family Court
concept. This interview would not prevent the court from ordering provi-
sional measures in cases of urgency, but would delay the trial of issues
on the merits.
In view of the importance of such a mechanism, the writer could
not do better than reproduce at length the Committee's comments on the
matter.
One interview would be mandatory, but family counselling could
be continued by agreement of the parties. The goal of the Com-
mittee in proposing this initial interview is not to force a recon-
ciliation of consorts at all costs. It is rather, on the one hand,
to permit the marriage counsellor to make an appreciation of the
viability of the marriage and the chances of reconciliation or mere
conciliation of the parties, and on the other, to assure the par-
ties, in this first step and from the outset of their contact with
the judicial process, access to specialized assistance that would
be necessary to assess the human problem they face, reduce the
tension between them, mitigate the harmful effects of the con-
flict, and finally, afford them time for reflection conducive to
the most harmonious solution of their differences.
If the parties wished to continue conciliation, dates might be
fixed at the first interview for subsequent interviews or the par-
ties might be referred to auxiliary services that could help them.
131. Id. at 202 (footnotes omitted).
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If conciliation were impossible, either because the parties have
been separated for several years or because one of them cannot
be located, or for any other-reason, the initial interview would
nevertheless clarify the situation and prepare the applicant for the
judicial proceedings he has undertaken.
It has often been considered regrettable that in cases of family
justice the first meeting of the parties should be before a court
of law, in a formal framework little suited for considering and
resolving problems of this nature. Introduction of the assessment
interview would be designed to rectify this situation by encourag-
ing a dialogue between the consorts, or at least permitting the
applicant to explain his (or her) difficulties to a third person out-
side the conflict. It would also provide an opportunity to examine
the problem in its human, as well as legal dimensions. The viability
of the marriage and the best interests of the family, particularly
of the children, would thus be brought into focus in considering
steps to be taken.
It must be understood that no one should expect this assess-
ment interview to provide genuine conciliation of the difficulties
between the parties. This interview will rather serve to initiate a
dialogue, relax the atmosphere, and open the way for study of
the nature of the problem and a search for compromise solutions.
It is to be hoped that after such an interview the Court's Family
counselling Service, or the community social services, will con-
tinue the work begun during the assessment interview, and that
the parties will be less hesitant to undertake long term therapy,
if it seems appropriate.
The initial assessment interview would be mandatory, at least
for the applicant, in that the case could not be inscribed for proof
and hearing until the applicant had appeared before the Family
counselling Service.
However, the same penalty could not be used with regard to
the defendant, since merely by refusing to go to an assessment
interview he could postpone the hearing of the case indefinitely.
The Committee also considered the possibility of ensuring the
presence of the defendant at the initial assessment interview by
the issue of a writ of subpoena or service of a Court order which,
should the defendant fail to comply with it, would entail the usual
penalties for contempt of court. However, this solution was re-
jected because it seemed too harsh. Nevertheless, it is hoped that
through their competence, the marriage counsellors and family
counsellors will encourage couples to use the services offered and




If, after the initial assessment interview, the couple were to
refuse to continue the counselling, or if the defendant failed to
appear at the interview, the marriage counsellor would file a cer-
tificate of non-conciliation with the Court. This certificate would
indicate, aside from the date of the assessment interview, that
both parties or only one of them appeared and that efforts toward
conciliation were a failure; it would also include an opinion of
the marriage counsellor as to whether the marriage was viable
or whether it would be impossible for the parties to continue to
live together in a satisfactory fashion. A copy of the certificate
of non-conciliation would be forwarded to the parties who, within
ten days after the filing of this certificate with the Court, would
produce and serve the detailed allegations of their application.
If, on the other hand, the parties were to wish to continue the
counselling, the marriage counsellor would set the dates for subse-
quent interviews or refer the couple to an appropriate commu-
nity service. Either party could terminate the counselling on his
own initiative, by serving notice to this effect on the other party
and the counsellor. Service of this notice on the opposite party
would institute proceedings on the issues. '32
If the matter were not settled and the case filed for hearing, however,
pre-trial conferences were considered to be of great value in circumscrib-
ing the issues, laying the ground-work for an agreement or compromise,
and enabling the judge to ascertain that every effort had been made to
negotiate accessory measures. Such pre-trial conferences were to be held
before a judge other than the one called upon to hear the case.
At trial, a court-ordered expertise by experts assigned to the court
would sometimes prove the only method to provide the court with the
objective information needed for an assessment of the family situation,
particularly as regards custody of children. Copies of the report would
be made available to the parties unless the court ordered otherwise for
exceptional reasons.
Professional secrecy, disclosure of expertise reports, confidentiality of
court files and of hearings, appeals, publication of judicial reports, com-
piling of statistics, and even physical arrangements of the premises were
also the subject of the Committee's discussion and recommendations. To
avoid the necessity of going into details, the list of the Committee's ninety-
three recommendations, in the appendix to this paper, will be sufficient
to indicate the scope and dimension of the Report.'33
These recommendations, for the most part, although more detailed,
132. Id. at 205-08 (footnotes omitted).
133. See id. at 249-73, app.
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do rejoin, for the essentials at least, the recommended code of procedure
in family matters which forms part of the recently published Family Law
- Dimensions of Justice.34
By the end of the day, the Report on the Family Court of the
C.C.R.O. had stressed the urgent need for reform of the Quebec judicial
system in family matters:
After pointing out the principal gaps in the present system and
defining the prime objectives of the reform, the Committee has
sought to elaborate the corrective action most likely to attain these
objectives, bearing in mind the Quebec, Canadian and North
American context in which the reforms will be carried out. It has
constantly tried to establish close links between the reforms and
the Court which will apply them.
The Committee further believes that the proposed objectives can
only be achieved through a modern administration of the judicial
system and related services. This administration will not be truly
effective unless it incorporates a means for self-assessment of the
judicial system, based on statistical data, which will provide for
continuous adaptation of the judicial apparatus and its auxiliary
services to the ever-changing needs of the clients.
The Quebec Family Court would certainly not be a panacea.
It is to be hoped, however, that in a calm atmosphere, such a
Court might promote the settlement of family conflicts and en-
courage better relations between members of the same family and,
in the long run, contribute to an easing of the social climate." 5
Although the government has not yet acted upon the recommenda-
tions of the Report and integrated family courts do not exist at present
in Quebec, important steps have been taken to adjoin to the Quebec
Superior Court's Family Division, both in Quebec and Montreal, aux-
iliary services of expertise in matters of custody of children and concilia-
tion services. Originally seen as a pilot project, these services have now
(since 1983) become a permanent feature of the court.
Given the constitutional problem that has been discussed, it is con-
ceivable that an integrated family court such as the one envisaged by the
C.C.R.O. may never see the day in Quebec as such, but it could in-
conspicuously be born without a name! The essential goal remains-that
family matters be dealt with in keeping with the objectives of a true family
134. See generally C. L'Heureux-Dubd, supra note 29.
135. Family Court, supra note 108, at 245-47.
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justice, to give to the reform of substantive family law its true meaning
and to insure its effectiveness in practice through the conflict resolution
process.
CONCLUSION
From 1866 to 1980, family law in Quebec underwent a fundamental
re-appraisal of its basic assumptions, in the process of modernization.
In the words of Professor Cr~peau:
The new Civil Code had to reflect the social, moral and
economic realities of today's Quebec; it had to be a body of law
that was alive and contemporary, and which would be responsive
to the concerns, attentive to the needs and in harmony with the
requirements of a changing society in search of a new
equilibrium. 36
But as Professor Cr6peau also stresses:
Above all, there most certainly will be no real success unless there
is awareness that reform is only one stage in the juridical life
of a people and that the evolution of practice and mores must
be followed with a view to the continual adaptation of the Civil
Code to the new and ever changing needs of Quebec society.'37
The Civil Code Revision Office's Report on the Quebec Civil Code,
of which Book Second on Family Law is the first to have been legislated
on so far, is a remarkable monument of its own in the true tradition
of Civil Law. It is a tribute to the exceptional jurist who was entrusted
with its realization, Professor Paul Crdpeau. Unmistakably, the work bears
the imprint of his erudition, broadness of mind, thorough knowledge of
our civilian institutions, and particularly of his admirable dedication to
the survival in Quebec of its most cherished heritage: its civil law. Carry-
ing through the reform of the Quebec Civil Code in a true scholarly
fashion, Professor Cr6peau has contributed not only to a vigorous renewal
of our civil law, but also to the culture of our people and to the judicial
life of Quebec.
136. 1 Report, supra note 5, at xxiv.








Chapter P" The Main Elements of the Problem
Following a study of the current situation, the Committee has con-
cluded that, as their structures and present concepts of family justice now
stand, neither the Superior Court nor the Social Welfare Court, which
hear most cases regarding children or families, adequately meets the needs
of those called to appear before them.
CHAPTER II: The Objectives of a Reform of Family Justice
With the intention of promoting an overall approach in the under-
standing of family problems and the search for solutions to these disputes,
the Committee on the Family Court recommends:
1. That a Family Court be created in the Province of Quebec with
jurisdiction in all family matters, presided over by specialized judges,
assisted by specialized auxiliary services and governed by procedural rules
specifically adapted to the nature of family conflicts (p. 33 et s.).
Chapter IIP Jurisdiction of the Family Court
2. That a Family Court be established with exclusive original jurisdic-
tion in first instance in matters of family law (p. 47 et s.).
3. That the Family Court include two administrative sections: a civil
section and a penal section (p. 48).
4. That the civil section of the Family Court have jurisdiction over
the following matters:
A. Relations between consorts:
-marriage,
-separation as to bed and board,
-divorce,
-annulment or nullity of marriage,
-recourse in cases of disagreement between consorts,
-recourse for support,
-reciprocal execution of maintenance orders,
-dissolution of matrimonial regimes,
19841 1627
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
-judicial separation as to property,
-conventional modifications to matrimonial regimes,
-protection of the family residence.
B. Relations between parents and children:
-repudiation and contestation of paternity,
-judicial acknowledgment of paternity or maternity,
-lying-in costs,




-obligation to support children,
-legal dispensation by reason of age for marriage,
-parental authority,
-tutorship of persons of minor age.
C. Other matters:
-judicial youth protection,
-protection of incapable persons of full age,
-protection of the mentally ill,
-absence,
-relations between de facto consorts,
-civil status,
-changes of name made under the provisions of the Civil
Code respecting correction of records and registers of civil
status, and filiation, or under the Adoption Act,
-habeas corpus to recover custody of a child of minor age,
-the law on successions,
-any other matter attributed to the Family Court by special
statute (pp. 48 to 50).
5. That the penal section of the Family Court have jurisdiction over
the following matters:
A. Offences committed by an adult:
-refusal to support,
-incest,
-sexual intercourse with step-daughter or adoptive daughter,
-father, mother or tutor who causes defilement,
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-corruption of children endangering morals,
-abandonment of a child,
-serious acts of violence between consorts or between parents
and children,
-abduction of a female under the age of sixteen,
-abduction of a child under the age of fourteen,
-theft by consort, while living apart, of an object belonging
to his spouse.
B. Offences committed by a child:
-Juvenile Delinquents Act,
-offences against provincial statutes or municipal by-laws
committed by children under the age of eighteen (pp. 51
to 53).
6. That Section 168 Cr. C. (corruption of children endangering
morals) be amended so that the mere fact of a consort living in de facto
union in the presence of his children is not enough by itself to constitute
a criminal act (p. 52).
7. That the Family Court have the power to refer certain cases of
juvenile delinquency according to the criteria of the Juvenile Delinquents
Act to ordinary criminal courts, as well as cases of criminal offences over
which it would have jurisdiction, if the gravity of the offences justified
this, taking all the circumstances into account, and if the court considered
that it could not deal adequately with the case with the means at its
disposal (pp. 53-54).
Chapter V: Organization of the Family Court
I. THE JUDGE
8. That, in principle, the judge of the Family Court be chosen from
among lawyers who have been practising for at least ten years. Candidates
should also possess personal and human qualities and aptitudes enabling
them to act as conciliators.
Moreover, the Committee considers that any knowledge which a can-
didate has of disciplines complementary to family law, especially sociology,
psychology, criminology or any experience acquired in various social ser-
• vices, should be taken into consideration (p. 118).
9. That one of the principal criteria in selecting candidates for the
position of Family Court judge be specialization in Family Law or, at
least, a considerable interest in problems related to children and families
(pp. 118-119).
10. That the Chief Justice of the Family Court be consulted on the
selection of candidates to act as judges of this Court (p. 119).
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11. That it be possible for newly appointed judges, before they assume
their duties, to acquaint themselves with the philosophy and operation
of the Family Court and with the different services with which they will
be called upon to collaborate (p. 119).
12. That continued training be ensured for the judges of the Family
Court, and that to this end these judges attend national and international
study sessions dealing with family law and with its application by the
courts (p. 119).
13. That the remuneration of Family Court judges be sufficient to
interest highly qualified jurists in assuming these duties (p. 119).
14. That, in addition to the duties traditionally conferred upon a Chief
Justice, the Chief Justice of the Family Court participate in the ad-
ministrative process of determining the standards and duties of the
specialized auxiliary services of the Court.
To these ends, the Committee recommends that machinery be set up
for consultation between the Chief Justice of-the Family Court, on the
one hand, and the directors of the various specialized auxiliary services
of this Court, on the other (pp. 120-121).
15. That the Chief Justice participate in planning the Family Court's
global budget (p. 121).
16. That the Chief Justice participate in the planning of training pro-
grammes intended for the professional personnel of the Family Court (pp.
121-122).
17. That the Chief Justice, acting as the official representative of
the Family Court, make known the objectives and work of the Court
to the departmental authorities concerned, to persons and organizations
interested in family problems, and to the general public.
To this end, the Committee recommends that the Chief Justice be
responsible for the transmission of periodic reports respecting significant
data on the operation of the Family Court to the Departments of Justice
and Social Affairs, and for publication of annual reports on the Family
Court's activities (p. 122).
II. The Mediator
18. That the office of mediator of the Family Court be instituted
(p. 124).
19. That mediators take cognizance in first instance of provisional
and accessory measures in matters of separation as to bed and board,
divorce and annulment of marriage, and also that they perform the duties
assigned to the Prothonotary of the Superior Court in family matters (p.
125).
20. That mediators be empowered to obtain all information useful
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for a fair and enlightened appraisal of the various factors in each case
(p. 125).
21. That any interested person be entitled to request the Court to
review any decision rendered by the mediator, within ten days after such
decision is rendered (p. 125).
22. That the mediator be appointed permanently by the Lieutenant-
Governor in Council, and not subject to dismissal except for improper
conduct or incompetence, following an inquiry made by the Court of Ap-
peal (p. 126).
23. That mediators be chosen from among lawyers and notaries who
have been practising for at least five years with specialization in family
law, and that in the selection of candidates, account be taken of their
personal qualities and their interest in family problems. Candidates'
knowledge of the disciplines complementary to family law should also
be taken into consideration (p. 126).
24. That a training and continuing education programme be made
available to mediators to allow them to become better acquainted with
the structure and workings of the Family Court (p. 127).
25. That the remuneration and fringe benefits offered to mediators
be sufficient to attract competent jurists (p. 127).
III. The Lawyer
The Committee acknowledges the right of every person, whether of
full or minor age to be represented by a lawyer before the Family Court
(p. 127 et s.).
26. That every person before the Court be entitled to retain the ser-
vices of the lawyer of his choice, or to make use of the services provided
under the Legal Aid Act if he is entitled thereto (p. 129).
27. That every child involved in proceedings before the Family Court
be entitled to legal aid services if he so desires, if his parent so request
and cannot meet the legal costs involved or if the judge, the mediator
or the Admission Service assigns proprio motu a legal adviser or a lawyer
to that child (pp. 129 and 132).
28. That the judge, the mediator or the Admission Service be bound
to notify the persons concerned, within an appropriate time, of their right
to representation by a lawyer and to the services of an attorney at the
expense of the State if, by reason of destitution, they cannot pay the
fees involved (pp. 131-132).
29. That every lawyer practising before the Family Court have suffi-
cient knowledge of the objectives, philosophy and procedure of both the
penal and the civil sections of that Court, and of the various means of
readjustment and assistance offered to the persons concerned.
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To this end, the Committee recommends that the law faculties in
Quebec include in their curriculum courses covering the philosophy,
organization and operations of the Family Court (pp. 132-133).
30. That every lawyer representing a client in a case be independent
of the Family Court. The Committee believes it appropriate, however,
to ensure that a liaison officer from the legal aid bureau be always pre-
sent at the Family Court (p. 134).
31. That the Family Court have at its disposal the services of lawyers
acting either as Crown prosecutors or as legal advisers attached to the
Admission Service.
Although ideally it would be preferable that the duties of Crown pro-
secutors and of legal advisers attached to the Admission Service be assumed
by different persons in order to avoid conflicts of interest, the Commit-
tee believes that these duties could be performed on a rotating basis by
litigation lawyers practising before the Court, provided performance of
these duties were carefully regulated in such a way as to avoid all in-
discretion to the detriment of the persons involved in a case (p. 134 et s.).
IV. Specialized Auxiliary Services
32. That the Family Court be endowed with the specialized auxiliary
services necessary for its proper operation. These services would entail:
1. the Admission Service;
2. the Family counselling Service;
3. the Investigation Service;
4. the Clinical Service;
5. the Probation and Child Services;
6. the Support Collection Service (p. 136 et s.).
33. That the specialized auxiliary services be administratively indepen-
dent of judicial authority and responsible for the administration and care
of their records and for access to them in conformity with the rules of
confidentiality applicable to each of them, regardless of the means by
which these services were ensured to the Family Court, whether by the
creation of a new body, by way of contracts for services with already
existing bodies, or by the establishment of services directly attached to
the Court (p. 138).
1. The Admission Service
34. That an Admission Service be created to analyse and assess cases
which it is sought to submit to the attention of the Court, with a view
to determining whether such cases should be referred to a judge, entrusted
to a social service, or settled.
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This Service should receive the parties, gather information relevant
to the issues submitted to it, study with the persons involved the
possibilities of out-of-court settlement, advise them as to the various ser-
vices offered and, where need be, direct them to such services (pp.
140-141).
35. That the Admission Service intervene only after the persons con-
cerned voluntarily agree to an analysis of their situation and to follow
any recommendations which are made to them and consequently, that
the Admission Service not be authorized to impose any measures without
the consent of those involved, and that it be bound to inform them of
their right to apply directly to the Court and of their right to be represented
by a lawyer (p. 141).
36. That the Admission Service consist of a team of jurists, profes-
sional social workers, psychologists and the appropriate competent an-
cillary staff.
The professionals attached to the Admission Service should also
possess such personal qualities and aptitudes as interest in the work of
the Family Court, emotional stability, firm judgment, tact, and the ability
to get along with people (pp. 149-150).
37. That the members of the Admission Service follow a training pro-
gramme during which they would be introduced to the work patterns
followed within that Service and to the philosophy of the Family Court,
and would receive basic legal or psycho-social training related to their
duties, according to their initial training (p. 150).
2. The Family counselling Service
38. That a Family counselling Service be set up at the Family Court
to encourage reconciliation of consorts as far as possible, favouring con-
ciliation of their differences, and to improve relations between them,
especially when young children are involved, in order to ensure that such
children develop in the most favourable circumstances.
The Family counselling Service would also intervene between children
and their parents, upon reference from the Admission Service or from
the judge, especially in cases involving youth protection, juvenile delin-
quency, judicial dispensation as regards the age of marriage, disputes be-
tween parents in the exercise of parental authority (p. 151 et s.).
39. That, in the initial stage, the objectives of family and marriage
counselling be to allow the persons concerned to pin-point their problems
and to seek out the real causes of their difficulties and, at a later stage,
to induce these persons to resolve their conflicts and, where need be, direct
them to the services equipped to provide the special assistance and care
which their individual circumstances require (p. 152).
40. That the Family counselling Service be attached to the Family
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Court, but autonomous in its operation and geographically separate from
the Court itself, although not too far removed from it (p. 153).
41. That the Family counselling Service be available to every person
who wishes to avail himself of it, even before proceedings are instituted.
In cases of formal applications for divorce, separation as to bed and board
or annulment of marriage, the petitioner should be compelled to attend
a preliminary interview for assessment with the Family counselling Ser-
vice, during which a family counsellor would assess the viability of the
marriage and advise the client of the services offered (pp. 154-155).
42. That the Family counselling Service be made up of marriage
counsellors with adequate specialized training in this field (pp. 155-156).
43. That henceforth our universities provide a training programme
in marriage counselling and family counselling to prepare the personnel
required to satisfy the needs of the population in this field, when the
time comes (p. 156).
3. The Investigation Service
44. That the Family Court have an Investigation Service at its disposal
to furnish the Court with objective factors to consider in the circumstances
surrounding persons involved in disputes of a family nature (p. 157 et s.).
45. That, except in the cases expressly provided for by law, social
investigation not be systematically required in either civil or penal mat-
ters, but that its use be left to the discretion of the judge or the mediator,
who would order such an investigation either proprio motu or on ap-
plication by the parties (pp. 159-160).
46. That in civil matters the Court resort to a social investigation
only where the law encourages it to weigh the circumstances surrounding
the parties when it renders its decision.
In penal matters, the social investigation report should not be delivered
to the judge until he has pronounced judgment on the accusation (p. 159).
47. That the investigator have at least college training with specializa-
tion in social aid work or in a related field. Team leaders and service
heads should have appropriate university training in social work (p. 160).
48. That the investigator not be entitled to consult the confidential
files of the Court or of its services and, in particular, that he not have
access to the files of the Admission Service or of the Family counselling
Service (p. 161).
4. The Clinical Service
49. That the Family Court have at its disposal a Clinical Service con-
sisting of specialists in psycho-social behavioural sciences and in medicine.
This service would be responsible for carrying out any clinical assessments
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required by the judge and for acting as adviser to the Admission Service,
the Family counselling Service and the Probation Service (pp. 162-163).
50. That in the major urban centres, a Clinical Service be attached
to the Family Court. In judicial districts where it is not necessary to pro-
vide a Clinical Service on a permanent basis, existing community resources
should give priority to the Family Court with regard to the specialized
professional aid required (p. 163).
5. The Probation Service and Child Services
51. That the Family Court have a Probation Service responsible for
supervising any child or adult on whom the Court has imposed proba-
tionary measures and for promoting the social rehabilitation of such per-
son (pp. 163-166).
52. That the Probation Service have sufficient qualified personnel to
enable the probation officer to accomplish his task efficiently and to carry
out in-depth work with the young people and adults entrusted to him
(p. 166).
53. That the probation officer have university training in either social
work or psychology. That he possess certain personal qualities such as
interest in the work of the Court, sound judgment, tact, emotional stability
and the ability to work harmoniously with people. In addition, he should
undergo a training period during which he would be initiated to the work-
ing methods of his Service, to the philosophy of the Family Court and
learn certain legal concepts pertaining to his task. (p. 166).
54. That the probation officer receive a remuneration sufficient to
attract highly qualified persons. The probation officer should be
remunerated for any overtime work he must devote to his professional
practice, or his working day should be planned on the basis of the par-
ticular needs of clients who cannot meet their probation officer during
the daytime and with consideration for the great distances probation of-
ficers occasionally must travel (pp. 166-167).
55. That the Family Court be entitled to call upon a vast network
of institutional services of various types designed to satisfy adequately
all needs for reception, emergency assistance, observation, protective
custody and re-education of children. These services should be obliged
to submit to the Court periodically a written report regarding the pro-
gress of each child entrusted to them (p. 167).
6. The Support Collection Service
56. That a Support Collection Service be set up in connection with
the Family Court, responsible for ensuring, in cooperation with social aid
services, immediate emergency assistance to persons entitled to support
who are in need and, in cases where those owing support fail to pay,
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to take action for payment of the support granted by judgment (pp.
169-170).
57. That when the person owing support fails to pay, the person en-
titled to support, if otherwise eligible for social aid, be paid the .allowances
to which he would be entitled under the standards of the Social Aid Act
(p. 169).
58. That the Support Collection Service be subrogated in the rights
of any person entitled to support (p. 170).
59. That the Support Collection Service be given the powers and per-
sonnel necessary for the accomplishment of its task and provided with
modern working instruments to enable it to work quickly and efficiently.
The Collection Service should be entitled to conduct inquiries among
information agencies and government services which should be legally
obliged to supply the information required (pp. 171-172).
60. That the Support Collection Service staff include investigators,
liaison officers from social aid services, lawyers, accountants and clerks
(p. 172).
61. That the Support Collection Service be a distinct service attached
to the Family Court and set apart from any existing service (pp. 172-173).
V. The Coordination Committee
62. That a Coordination Committee be set up consisting of the Chief
Justice, the director of each specialized auxiliary service of the Family
Court, a representative of the Department of Justice and one from the
Department of Social Affairs (pp. 173-174).
63. That the Coordination Committee be assisted by a permanent
secretariat responsible for following the progress of the Family court, for
analysing statistical data pertaining to the activities of the Court, for com-
piling information and recommendations with respect to the administra-
tion of family justice, and for reporting to the members of the Commit-
tee (p. 174).
64. That the Coordination Committee act as a link between the Family
Court, its specialized auxiliary services and the two Departments which
are primarily involved in the administration of family justice. This Com-
mittee should also have the task of coordinating various administrative
or legislative recommendations with regard to the Family Court, and of
forwarding them to the competent authorities (p. 174).
Chapter VI: Procedure Before the Family Court
1. Procedure in Civil Matters
65. That, even in the absence of formal proceedings for separation
as to bed and board or divorce, either consort be allowed to bring family
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problems before the Admission Service by affidavit, and request the
assistance of the Court's Family counselling Service in such matters (p.
197).
66. That in the initial stage of proceedings, suit be instituted by mo-
tion in order to speed up the judicial process and to promote a climate
conducive to mediation of disputes. If conciliation should fail and it
becomes necessary to go through with the judicial process, the rules govern-
ing the action should apply, in order to protect the rights of the parties
to a full and complete defence (p. 199).
67. That designation of parties in family matters be made less con-
tentious. To this end, a motion to institute such proceedings could be
entitled: "The Family of A and B" (pp. 199-200).
68. That any motion to institute proceedings in matters of separa-
tion as to bed and board or of divorce comprise a single request that
the Court inquire into the viability or failure of the marriage.
69. That the applicant not be allowed to submit any exact and precise
details until after the assessment interview, and within ten days following
deposit of the certificate attesting to the failure of the attempts at con-
ciliation. If there should be any further interviews with the marriage
counsellor, submission of details of the request would be suspended until
after deposit in the file of either the certificate of non-conciliation or a
notice from either party to the effect that it wished to terminate concilia-
tion (p. 202).
70. That every application to the Family Court be accompanied by
a form, signed by the applicant containing the data required by the Court
(p. 203).
71. That legible mention be made on the document to be served of
the existence of a Family counselling Service, and that publicity folders
prepared by the Family counselling Service be attached to such document
(p. 204).
72. That the parties be called by the Family counselling Service for
an assessment of the conflict between them and, if possible, to conciliate
their differences. One interview would be compulsory, but family counsel-
ling could be continued if the parties agreed to it (p. 204 et s.).
73. That the Court be empowered to adjourn the proceedings if it
believes this would be conducive to reconciliation of the parties, or would
provide the consorts with a period for reflection, permitting them to reach
agreement on questions of child custody and determination of support.
In this event, the Court could, either with agreement of the parties or
on its own authority, refer the consorts to a marriage counsellor (pp.
208-209).
74. That any family counselling ordered by the Court during the pro-
ceedings be limited to a period of not more than thirty days, unless the
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parties agreed mutually to continue, or the Court ordered an extension
for an additional period not to exceed thirty days (p. 209).
75. That a provisional exparte order determining the amount of sup-
port to be paid during the proceedings should be made as soon as a mo-
tion for it has been filed, without the parties being required to appear
before the Court. The amount of the support would be determined by
the mediator according to tariffs established previously and based on a
sliding scale, taking into account the resources of the person owing sup-
port, the number of children in the custody of the person entitled to sup-
port, and the age and schooling of such children. This decision could
be contested by the opposing party, by a written notice served within ten
days (p. 212).
76. That in family matters, use be made of the pre-trial conference
provided for in article 279 of the Code of Civil Procedure (pp. 213-214).
77. That the Family Court be authorized to order a social investiga-
tion or an expert medical opinion, even on its own initiative; that the
investigator or medical expert involved be designated by the Court, and
the expenses borne by the State (p. 214).
II. Procedure in Family Matters of a Penal Nature
78. That in exercising its penal jurisdiction, the Family Court avoid,
as much as possible, any punitive or repressive concept of justice, and
that it avail itself of its specialized auxiliary services, especially the Ad-
mission Service and the Family counselling Service (pp. 218-219).
79. That a periodic review be assured of cases where children are
placed outside their natural family surroundings, and where children or
adults are released on probation. At the time of this review, it would
be appropriate to consult with the child or adult concerned, and with
the persons or organizations responsible for him (p. 219).
80. That whenever a child is called as a witness before a court of
criminal jurisdiction, that child be placed under the protection of the
Family Court so that he will be better prepared for the experience of
the examination; that police inquiry and questioning of children before
any court of criminal jurisdiction be carried out by specialized services
for children, and finally that the examination of any child in a criminal
court be carried out in camera (p. 220).
III. Procedure Common to the Civil Section and the Penal Section of
the Family Court
81. That all statements made and information given to a member
of the Admission Service or to a family counsellor in the performance
of his duties-whether or not this person is attached to the Court's Family
counselling Service or to a community service providing such assistance-be
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strictly confidential and never used as evidence in any judicial proceedings.
The Committee moreover believes that the Admission Service and the
Family counselling Service should inform all int6rested persons of the con-
fidential nature of their declarations (pp. 220-221).
82. That the Code of Civil Procedure be amended to include a rule
similar to Section 21 of the Divorce Act. This new rule would prohibit
all members of the Admission Service and all professionals acting as family
counsellors from divulging confidential information obtained in their pro-
fessional capacities, and would protect them from being compelled in this
respect; it would also provide that nothing disclosed to these persons dur-
ing admission or counselling interviews would be admissible as evidence
in any judicial proceedings (pp. 222-223).
83. That the results of every social investigation be forwarded, within
a reasonable time before the hearing, to the lawyers of the parties and
to the parties themselves, unless the judge decides otherwise if he feels
that disclousre [sic] of the report would seriously prejudice the emotional
and mental balance of the person concerned, and compromise his
rehabilitation and the efforts made to improve his relations with other
members of his family (pp. 224-225).
84. That the author of any social investigation report, and his sources,
be subject to cross-examination by the parties or their lawyers.
Recommendations 83 and 84 would also apply to expert medical opin-
ions (pp. 225-226).
85. That only those directly concerned, namely the parties, their
lawyers and the personnel of the Court, be given legal access to the Family
Court's judicial files, including the information form.
Access to the Court's files could be authorized by the judge for
research purposes, provided the identity of the persons concerned is not
disclosed. The files should also be available for preparation of statistics
on the activities of the Court (pp. 226-227).
86. That anonymity of the parties be assured through identification
of persons by their initials only (p. 227).
87. That the general public not be admitted to sessions of either the
penal or the civil section of the Family Court (p. 228).
88. That the judge be authorized to admit certain persons to hear-
ings of the Court if he considers that they have a legitimate research in-
terest, or for any other valid reason (p. 229).
89. That members of the press be entitled to attend sessions of the
Family Court de jure on the express condition that they in no way iden-
tify the parties involved, and that if this prohibition is broken, severe
penalties be imposed. Adoption proceedings would not be subject to this
rule, however, because of their confidential nature (p. 230).
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90. That once all family matters have been integrated under the
authority of a single court, all appeals from decisions rendered in such
matters, when such procedure is established, be made to the Quebec Court
of Appeal. The rules of practice of the Court of Appeal should be
amended, particularly in respect of cases involving children, so that hear-
ings can be held quickly and expenses kept to a minimum (pp. 230-231).
91. That the decisions of the Family Court be published in a collec-
tion available to the Bar, to the Bench and to the public at large (p. 231).
92. That suitable monthly statistics be compiled on the activities of
the Family Court and of the specialized auxiliary services (p. 232).
93. That a special effort be made to arrange the premises of the Court
in such a manner as to create a calm and relaxed atmosphere. The Com-
mittee also believes the judges and lawyers should wear their gowns only
during hearings of contested cases (p. 233).
